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THE NEW GOVERNORS: THE PEOPLE, RULES, AND 
PROCESSES GOVERNING ONLINE SPEECH 
Kate Klonick∗ 
Private online platforms have an increasingly essential role in free speech and 
participation in democratic culture.  But while it might appear that any internet user can 
publish freely and instantly online, many platforms actively curate the content posted by 
their users.  How and why these platforms operate to moderate speech is largely opaque. 
This Article provides the first analysis of what these platforms are actually doing to 
moderate online speech under a regulatory and First Amendment framework.  Drawing 
from original interviews, archived materials, and internal documents, this Article 
describes how three major online platforms — Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube — 
moderate content and situates their moderation systems into a broader discussion of 
online governance and the evolution of free expression values in the private sphere.  It 
reveals that private content-moderation systems curate user content with an eye to 
American free speech norms, corporate responsibility, and the economic necessity of 
creating an environment that reflects the expectations of their users.  In order to 
accomplish this, platforms have developed a detailed system rooted in the American legal 
system with regularly revised rules, trained human decisionmaking, and reliance on a 
system of external influence. 
This Article argues that to best understand online speech, we must abandon traditional 
doctrinal and regulatory analogies and understand these private content platforms as 
systems of governance.  These platforms are now responsible for shaping and allowing 
participation in our new digital and democratic culture, yet they have little direct 
accountability to their users.  Future intervention, if any, must take into account how and 
why these platforms regulate online speech in order to strike a balance between preserving the 
democratizing forces of the internet and protecting the generative power of our New Governors. 
INTRODUCTION 
In a lot of ways Facebook is more like a government than a traditional 
company.  We have this large community of people, and more than other 
technology companies we’re really setting policies. 
  — Mark Zuckerberg1 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Ph.D. in Law Candidate, Yale University, and Resident Fellow at the Information Society at 
Yale Law School.  Research for this project was made possible with the generous support of the 
Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fund.  The author is grateful to Jack Balkin, Molly Brady, Kiel Brennan-
Marquez, Peter Byrne, Adrian Chen, Bryan Choi, Danielle Keats Citron, Rebecca Crootof, Evelyn 
Frazee, Tarleton Gillespie, Eric Goldman, James Grimmelmann, Brad Greenberg, Alexandra 
Gutierrez, Woody Hartzog, David Hoffman, Gus Hurwitz, Thomas Kadri, Margot Kaminski, 
Alyssa King, Jonathan Manes, Toni Massaro, Christina Mulligan, Frank Pasquale, Robert Post, 
Sabeel Rahman, Jeff Rosen, Andrew Selbst, Jon Shea, Rebecca Tushnet, and Tom Tyler for helpful 
thoughts and comments on earlier versions of this Article.  A special thank you to Rory Van Loo, 
whose own paper workshop inadvertently inspired me to pursue this topic.  Elizabeth Goldberg 
and Deborah Won provided invaluable and brilliant work as research assistants. 
 1 DAVID KIRKPATRICK, THE FACEBOOK EFFECT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COMPANY 
THAT IS CONNECTING THE WORLD 254 (2010). 
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In the summer of 2016, two historic events occurred almost simulta-
neously: a bystander captured a video of the police shooting of Alton 
Sterling on his cell phone, and another recorded the aftermath of the 
police shooting of Philando Castile and streamed the footage via  
Facebook Live.2  Following the deaths of Sterling and Castile, Facebook 
founder and CEO Mark Zuckerberg stated that the ability to instantly 
post a video like the one of Castile dying “reminds us why coming to-
gether to build a more open and connected world is so important.”3  
President Barack Obama issued a statement saying the shootings were 
“symptomatic of the broader challenges within our criminal justice sys-
tem,”4 and the Department of Justice opened an investigation into  
Sterling’s shooting and announced that it would monitor the Castile in-
vestigation.5  Multiple protests took place across the country.6  The im-
pact of these videos is an incredible example of how online platforms 
are now essential to participation in democratic culture.7  But it almost 
never happened. 
Initially lost in the voluminous media coverage of these events was 
a critical fact: as the video of Castile was streaming, it suddenly disap-
peared from Facebook.8  A few hours later, the footage reappeared, this 
time with a label affixed warning of graphic content.9  In official state-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 2 Richard Fausset et al., Alton Sterling Shooting in Baton Rouge Prompts Justice Dept. Inves-
tigation, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2szuH6H [https://perma.cc/Q8T6-HHXE]; 
Manny Fernandez et al., 11 Officers Shot, 4 Fatally, at Rally Against Violence, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 
2016, at A1. 
 3 Mark Zuckerberg, Post, FACEBOOK (July 7, 2016), https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/ 
10102948714100101 [https://perma.cc/PP9M-FRTU].  
 4 Press Release, White House, President Obama on the Fatal Shootings of Alton Sterling and 
Philando Castile (July 7, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/07/07/president-
obama-fatal-shootings-alton-sterling-and-philando-castile [https://perma.cc/VUL4-QT44]. 
 5 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch Delivers Statement 
on Dallas Shooting (July 8, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-loretta-e-
lynch-delivers-statement-dallas-shooting [https://perma.cc/UG89-XJXW]. 
 6 Fernandez et al., supra note 2; Liz Sawyer, Protest Results in Brief Closure of State Fair’s 
Main Gate, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis) (Sept. 3, 2016, 9:38 PM), http://www.startribune.com/ 
protesters-gather-at-site-where-castile-was-shot/392247781/ [https://perma.cc/8Y4W-VF2Z]; Mitch 
Smith et al., Peaceful Protests Follow Minnesota Governor’s Call for Calm, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 
2016), http://nyti.ms/2CqolWM [https://perma.cc/HRQ6-CTUC]. 
 7 See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expres-
sion for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004). 
 8 How Did Facebook Handle the Live Video of the Police Shooting of Philando Castile?, WASH. 
POST (July 7, 2016, 11:45 AM), http://wapo.st/2ByazET [https://perma.cc/T6ZK-RZRC]; Mike 
Isaac & Sydney Ember, Live Footage of Shootings Forces Facebook to Confront New Role, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 8, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2CpLI37 [https://perma.cc/ZHR5-FAJE]. 
 9 Isaac & Ember, supra note 8.  
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ments, Facebook blamed the takedown on a “technical glitch” but pro-
vided no further details.10  This is not entirely surprising.  Though it 
might appear that any internet user can publish freely and instantly 
online, many content-publication platforms actively moderate11 the con-
tent posted by their users.12  Yet despite the essential nature of these 
platforms to modern free speech and democratic culture,13 very little is 
known about how or why these companies curate user content.14 
In response to calls for transparency, this Article examines precisely 
what these private platforms are actually doing to moderate user- 
generated content and why they are doing so.  It argues that these plat-
forms are best thought of as self-regulating15 private entities, governing 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 10 William Turton, Facebook Stands by Technical Glitch Claim, Says Cop Didn’t Delete  
Philando Castile Video, GIZMODO (July 8, 2016, 1:36 PM), http://gizmodo.com/facebook-stands-
by-technical-glitch-claim-says-cop-did-1783349993 [https://perma.cc/3ZWP-7SM9]. 
 11 I use the terms “moderate,” “curate,” and sometimes “regulate” to describe the behavior of 
these private platforms in both keeping up and taking down user-generated content.  I use these 
terms rather than using the term “censor,” which evokes the ideas of only removal of material and 
various practices of culturally expressive discipline or control.  See generally Robert C. Post, Pro-
ject Report: Censorship and Silencing, 51 BULL. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 32, 32 (1998).  Where 
I do use “regulate,” I do so in a more colloquial sense and not the way in which Professor Jack 
Balkin uses the term “speech regulation,” which concerns government regulation of speech or gov-
ernment cooperation, coercion, or partnership with private entities to reflect government ends.  See 
Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296, 2299 (2014) 
(also explaining that the phrase “collateral censorship” is a term of art exempted from this  
taxonomy). 
 12 See Catherine Buni & Soraya Chemaly, The Secret Rules of the Internet: The Murky History 
of Moderation, and How It’s Shaping the Future of Free Speech, THE VERGE (Apr. 13, 2016), 
https://www.theverge.com/2016/4/13/11387934/internet-moderator-history-youtube-facebook-reddit- 
censorship-free-speech [https://perma.cc/PDM3-P6YH]; Adrian Chen, The Laborers Who Keep Dick 
Pics and Beheadings Out of Your Facebook Feed, WIRED (Oct. 23, 2014, 6:30 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2014/10/content-moderation/ [https://perma.cc/L5ME-T4H6]; Jeffrey Rosen, 
Google’s Gatekeepers, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 28, 2008), http://nyti.ms/2oc9lqw [https://perma.cc/ 
YBM8-TNXC]. 
 13 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017) (holding that a state statute bar-
ring registered sex offenders from using online social media platforms was unconstitutional under 
the First Amendment).  In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy wrote that “[w]hile in the past 
there may have been difficulty in identifying the most important places (in a spatial sense) for the 
exchange of views, today the answer is clear.  It is cyberspace — the ‘vast democratic forums of the 
Internet’ in general, and social media in particular.”  Id. at 1735 (citation omitted) (quoting Reno v. 
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997)). 
 14 See, e.g., Marvin Ammori, The “New” New York Times: Free Speech Lawyering in the Age 
of Google and Twitter, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2259, 2273–76 (2014); Marjorie Heins, The Brave New 
World of Social Media Censorship, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 325, 326 (2014) (describing Facebook’s 
internal appeals process as “mysterious at best” and noting, about their internal policies, that “[t]he 
details of these rules . . . we do not know” and that the censorship “process in the private world of 
social media is secret”). 
 15 See generally Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 
(2000); Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory Tech-
nique, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 171 (1995). 
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speech within the coverage of the First Amendment16 by reflecting the 
democratic culture and norms of their users.17 
Part I surveys the regulatory and constitutional protections that have 
resulted in these private infrastructures.  The ability of private platforms 
to moderate content comes from § 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act18 (CDA), which gives online intermediaries broad immunity from 
liability for user-generated content posted on their sites.19  The purpose 
of this grant of immunity was both to encourage platforms to be “Good 
Samaritans” and take an active role in removing offensive content, and 
also to avoid free speech problems of collateral censorship.20  Beyond 
§ 230, courts have struggled with how to conceptualize online platforms 
within First Amendment doctrine: as state actors, as broadcasters, or as 
editors.  Additionally, scholars have moved between optimistic and pes-
simistic views of platforms and have long debated how — or whether — 
to constrain them. 
To this legal framework and scholarly debate, this Article applies 
new evidence.  Part II looks at why platforms moderate so intricately 
given the broad immunity of § 230.  Through interviews with former 
platform architects and archived materials, this Article argues that plat-
forms moderate content because of a foundation in American free speech 
norms, corporate responsibility, and the economic necessity of creating 
an environment that reflects the expectations of their users.  Thus, plat-
forms are motivated to moderate by both of § 230’s purposes: fostering 
Good Samaritan platforms and promoting free speech. 
Part III looks at how platforms are moderating user-generated con-
tent and whether that understanding can fit into an existing First 
Amendment framework.  Through internal documents, archived mate-
rials, interviews with platform executives, and conversations with con-
tent moderators, this Article shows that platforms have developed a sys-
tem that has marked similarities to legal or governance systems.  This 
includes the creation of a detailed list of rules, trained human deci-
sionmaking to apply those rules, and reliance on a system of external 
influence to update and amend those rules.  With these facts, this Article 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 16 See generally Balkin, supra note 11; Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First  
Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004). 
 17 See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991); ELINOR OSTROM, 
CRAFTING INSTITUTIONS FOR SELF-GOVERNING IRRIGATION SYSTEMS (1992); Balkin, su-
pra note 7; J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE L.J. 
1935, 1948–49 (1995) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF 
FREE SPEECH (1993), and defining democratic culture as popular participation in culture); Robert 
C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 
STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986). 
 18 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
 19 Id. 
 20 See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that the purposes of 
intermediary immunity in § 230 were not only to incentivize platforms to remove indecent content 
but also to protect the free speech of platform users). 
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argues that analogy under purely First Amendment doctrine should be 
largely abandoned. 
Instead, platforms should be thought of as operating as the New 
Governors of online speech.  These New Governors are part of a new 
triadic model of speech that sits between the state and speakers- 
publishers.  They are private, self-regulating entities that are economi-
cally and normatively motivated to reflect the democratic culture and 
free speech expectations of their users.  Part IV explains how this con-
ceptualization of online platforms as governance fits into scholarly con-
cerns over the future of digital speech and democratic culture.  It argues 
that the biggest threat this private system of governance poses to dem-
ocratic culture is the loss of a fair opportunity to participate, which is 
compounded by the system’s lack of direct accountability to its users.  
The first solution to this problem should not come from changes to § 230 
or new interpretations of the First Amendment, but rather from simple 
changes to the architecture and governance systems put in place by these 
platforms.  If this fails and regulation is needed, it should be designed 
to strike a balance between preserving the democratizing forces of the 
internet and protecting the generative power of our New Governors, 
with a full and accurate understanding of how and why these platforms 
operate, as presented here.  It is only through accurately understanding 
the infrastructures and motivations of our New Governors that we can 
ensure that the free speech rights essential to our democratic culture 
remain protected. 
I.  SECTION 230, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND THE 
BEGINNINGS OF INTERMEDIARY SELF-REGULATION 
Before the internet, the most significant constraint on the impact and 
power of speech was the publisher.21  The internet ended the speaker’s 
reliance on the publisher by allowing the speaker to reach his or her 
audience directly.22  Over the last fifteen years, three American compa-
nies — YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter — have established themselves 
as dominant platforms in global content sharing.23  These platforms are 
both the architecture for publishing new speech and the architects of the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 21 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 2.0, at 19 (2006). 
 22 Id.; Balkin, supra note 11, at 2306–10. 
 23 Facebook Grows as Dominant Content Sharing Destination, MARKETING CHARTS (Aug. 24, 
2016), https://www.marketingcharts.com/digital-70111 [https://perma.cc/VA4T-LM5Z] (describing 
Facebook and Twitter as the top content sharing destinations); Facebook vs. YouTube: The Domi-
nant Video Platform of 2017, STARK CREW (Jan. 11, 2017), http://starkcrew.com/facebook-vs-
youtube-the-dominant-video-platform-of-2017/ [https://perma.cc/5TTA-VJ64] (naming Facebook 
and YouTube as the dominant platforms for sharing video content online and summarizing their 
statistics). 
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institutional design that governs it.24  This private architecture is the 
“central battleground over free speech in the digital era.”25 
A.  History and Development of § 230 
In order to understand the private governance systems used by plat-
forms to regulate user content, it is necessary to start with the legal 
foundations and history that allowed for such a system to develop.  The 
broad freedom of internet intermediaries26 to shape online expression is 
based in § 230 of the CDA, which immunizes providers of “interactive 
computer services” from liability arising from user-generated content.27  
Sometimes called “the law that matters most for speech on the Web,” 
the existence of § 230 and its interpretation by courts have been essential 
to the development of the internet as we know it today.28 
Central to understanding the importance of § 230 are two cases de-
cided before its existence, which suggested that intermediaries would be 
liable for defamation posted on their sites if they actively exercised any 
editorial discretion over offensive speech.29  The first, Cubby, Inc. v. 
CompuServe, Inc.,30 involved the publication of libel on CompuServe 
forums.31  The court found CompuServe could not be held liable for the 
defamatory content in part because the intermediary did not review any 
of the content posted to the forum.32  The Cubby court reasoned that 
CompuServe’s practice of not actively reviewing content on its site made 
it more like a distributor of content, and not a publisher.33  In determin-
ing communication tort liability, this distinction is important because 
while publishers and speakers of content can be held liable, distributors 
are generally not liable unless they knew or should have known of the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 24 LESSIG, supra note 21, at 2–10 (describing the internet as architecture). 
 25 Balkin, supra note 11, at 2296. 
 26 Internet intermediaries are broadly defined as actors in every part of the internet “stack.”  See 
JAMES GRIMMELMANN, INTERNET LAW 31 (2016).  These include internet service providers, 
hosting providers, servers, websites, social networks, search engines, and so forth.  See id. at 31–
32.  Within this array, I use “platforms” to refer specifically to internet websites or apps that publish 
user content — these include Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter. 
 27 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2012); see also Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 
1997) (blocking claims against AOL under § 230 because AOL was only the publisher, and not the 
creator, of the tortious content). 
 28 Emily Bazelon, How to Unmask the Internet’s Vilest Characters, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 22, 
2011), http://nyti.ms/2C30ZL9 [https://perma.cc/55A3-6FAN]. 
 29 See Davis S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of 
Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 373, 406–09 (2010).  
 30 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 31 Id. at 138; Ardia, supra note 29, at 406–07.  CompuServe did not dispute that the statements 
were defamatory.  Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 138. 
 32 Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140.  
 33 Id. at 139–41. 
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defamation.34  Though distributor-publisher distinctions were an estab-
lished analogy in tort liability, the difficulty of using this model for 
online intermediaries quickly became apparent.  Four years after Cubby, 
in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,35 a court found that 
the intermediary Prodigy was liable as a publisher for all posts made on 
its site because it actively deleted some forum postings.36  To many, 
Prodigy’s actions seemed indistinguishable from those that had rendered 
CompuServe a mere distributor in Cubby, but the court found Prodigy’s 
use of automatic software and guidelines for posting were a “conscious 
choice, to gain the benefits of editorial control.”37  Read together, the 
cases seemed to expose intermediaries to a wide and unpredictable range 
of tort liability if they exercised any editorial discretion over content 
posted on their sites.  Accordingly, the cases created a strong disincentive 
for online intermediaries to expand business or moderate offensive con-
tent and threatened the developing landscape of the internet. 
Thankfully, the developing landscape of the internet was an active 
agenda item for Congress when the Stratton Oakmont decision came 
down.  Earlier that year, Senator James Exon had introduced the CDA, 
which aimed to regulate obscenity online by making it illegal to know-
ingly send or show minors indecent online content.38  Reacting to the 
concerns created by Stratton Oakmont, Representatives Chris Cox and 
Ron Wyden introduced an amendment to the CDA that would become 
§ 230.39  The Act, with the Cox-Wyden amendment, passed and was 
signed into law in February 1996.40  In its final form, § 230(c) stated that 
“[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated 
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another in-
formation content provider”41 in order to incentivize and protect inter-
mediaries’ Good Samaritan blocking of offensive material.42  Though, just 
a little over a year later, the Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU43 struck down 
the bulk of the anti-indecency sections of the CDA, § 230 survived.44 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 34 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 35 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). 
 36 Id. at *4. 
 37 Id. at *5. 
 38 See Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon’s Communications Decency Act: 
Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 52–53 (1996). 
 39 141 CONG. REC. H8469–70 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statements of Reps. Cox, Wyden, and 
Barton). 
 40 See Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. V, 110 Stat. 56, 133–43 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 
18 and 47 U.S.C.); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 81–91 (1996); S. REP. NO. 104-230, at 187–93 
(1996); S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 9 (1995).  For a full and thorough account of the legislative history of 
§ 230, see generally Cannon, supra note 38. 
 41 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012). 
 42 141 CONG. REC. H8469–70 (statement of Rep. Cox). 
 43 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 44 Id. at 885. 
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It soon became clear that § 230 would do more than just survive.  A 
few months after Reno, the Fourth Circuit established a foundational 
and expansive interpretation of § 230 in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.45  
Plaintiff Zeran sought to hold AOL liable for defamatory statements 
posted on an AOL message board by a third party.46  Zeran argued that 
AOL had a duty to remove the posting, post notice of the removed post’s 
falsity, and screen future defamatory material.47  The court disagreed.  
Instead, it found AOL immune under § 230 and held that the section 
precluded not only strict liability for publishers but also intermediary 
liability for distributors such as website operators.48  This holding also 
extinguished notice liability for online intermediaries.49 
While the holdings in Zeran were broad and sometimes controver-
sial,50 it was the court’s analysis as to the purposes and scope of § 230 
that truly shaped the doctrine.  In granting AOL the affirmative defense 
of immunity under § 230, the court recognized the Good Samaritan pro-
vision’s purpose of encouraging “service providers to self-regulate the 
dissemination of offensive material over their services.”51  But the court 
did not consider § 230 merely a congressional response to Stratton  
Oakmont.  Instead, the court looked to the plain text of § 230(c) granting 
statutory immunity to online intermediaries and drew new purpose be-
yond the Good Samaritan provision and found that intent “not difficult 
to discern”: 
Congress recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to freedom of 
speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium.  The imposition of tort 
liability on service providers for the communications of others represented, 
for Congress, simply another form of intrusive government regulation of 
speech.52 
Thus, while the court reasoned that § 230 lifted the “specter of tort 
liability” that might “deter service providers from blocking and screen-
ing offensive material,” it found it was also Congress’s design to immu-
nize intermediaries from any requirement to do so.53  Drawing on these 
free speech concerns, the court reasoned that the same “specter of tort 
liability” that discouraged intermediaries from policing harmful content 
also threatened “an area of such prolific speech” with “an obvious 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 45 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 46 Id. at 328. 
 47 Id. at 330. 
 48 Id. at 332. 
 49 Id. at 333. 
 50 See Developments in the Law — The Law of Cyberspace, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1574, 1613 (1999) 
(referring to Zeran’s holding as a “broad interpretation of § 230”). 
 51 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331. 
 52 Id. at 330 (emphases added). 
 53 Id. at 331. 
  
2018] THE NEW GOVERNORS 1607 
chilling effect.”54  “Faced with potential liability for each message re-
published by their services, interactive computer service providers 
might choose to severely restrict the number and type of messages 
posted.”55  In response to the question raised by Zeran of subjecting 
publishers like AOL to notice-based liability, the court again cited its 
free speech concerns but also recognized the practical realities of distrib-
utors: “Each notification would require a careful yet rapid investigation 
of the circumstances surrounding the posted information, a legal judg-
ment concerning the information’s defamatory character, and an on-the-
spot editorial decision whether to risk liability by allowing the continued 
publication of that information.”56 
The sheer volume of content to be policed by intermediaries, and 
their almost certain liability should they be notified and still publish, 
would lead to either haphazard takedowns at best, or widespread re-
moval at worst.  “Thus, like strict liability, liability upon notice has a 
chilling effect on the freedom of Internet speech.”57 
Zeran is a seminal decision in internet law not only because it gave 
broad immunity to online intermediaries58 but also because of its anal-
ysis of the purposes of § 230.  The court recognized two distinct con-
gressional purposes for granting immunity under § 230: (1) as a Good 
Samaritan provision written to overturn Stratton Oakmont and “to en-
courage interactive computer services and users of such services to self-
police the Internet for obscenity and other offensive material,”59 and (2) 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id.  The quote continues: “Congress considered the weight of the speech interests implicated 
and chose to immunize service providers to avoid any such restrictive effect.”  Id. 
 56 Id. at 333. 
 57 Id.  Though this free speech purpose might not have been in the plain text of § 230, the Zeran 
court did not invent it.  See Cannon, supra note 38, at 88–91 (discussing the legislative history 
indicating that Congress debated the “contest between censorship and democratic discourse,” id. at 
88). 
 58 A number of scholars have criticized the reasoning in Zeran and its progeny for this reason.  
See, e.g., Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The Case of Interme-
diary Liability for Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569, 594–96 (2001); Sewali K. Patel, Im-
munizing Internet Service Providers from Third-Party Internet Defamation Claims: How Far 
Should Courts Go?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 647, 679–89 (2002); David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and 
the Effect of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act upon Liability for Defamation on the 
Internet, 61 ALB. L. REV. 147, 169–70 (1997); Michael H. Spencer, Defamatory E-Mail and Em-
ployer Liability: Why Razing Zeran v. America Online Is a Good Thing, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 25 
(2000); Michelle J. Kane, Note, Blumenthal v. Drudge, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 483, 498–500 
(1999); Brian C. McManus, Note, Rethinking Defamation Liability for Internet Service Providers, 
35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 647, 667–68 (2001); Annemarie Pantazis, Note, Zeran v. America Online, 
Inc.: Insulating Internet Service Providers from Defamation Liability, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
531, 547–50 (1999); David Wiener, Note, Negligent Publication of Statements Posted on Electronic 
Bulletin Boards: Is There Any Liability Left After Zeran?, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 905 (1999). 
 59 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003) (first citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4) (2012); 
then citing 141 CONG. REC. H8469–70 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statements of Reps. Cox, Wyden, 
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as a free speech protection for users meant “to encourage the unfettered 
and unregulated development of free speech on the Internet, and to pro-
mote the development of e-commerce.”60 
Though the exact term is not stated in the text of Zeran, the court’s 
concern over service providers’ “natural incentive simply to remove 
messages upon notification, whether the contents were defamatory or 
not,” reflects apprehension of collateral censorship.61  Collateral censor-
ship occurs when one private party, like Facebook, has the power to 
control speech by another private party, like a Facebook user.62  Thus, 
if the government threatens to hold Facebook liable based on what its 
user says, and Facebook accordingly censors its user’s speech to avoid 
liability, you have collateral censorship.63  The court in Zeran recognized 
this concern for the free speech rights of users and counted it among the 
reasons for creating immunity for platforms under § 230. 
But while the dual purposes of § 230 call for the same solution — 
intermediary immunity — they create a paradox in the applications of 
§ 230.  If § 230 can be characterized as both government-created im-
munity to (1) encourage platforms to remove certain kinds of content, 
and (2) avoid the haphazard removal of certain content and the perils of 
collateral censorship to users, which interests do we want to prioritize?  
That of the platforms to moderate their content or that of users’ free 
speech? 
In the last few years, courts have grappled with precisely this di-
lemma and occasionally broken with the expansive interpretation of the 
Good Samaritan provision to find a lack of § 230 immunity.64  For in-
stance, in two recent district court cases in northern California, the court 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
and Barton); then citing Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331; and then citing Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 
44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998)). 
 60 Id. at 1027–28 (first citing § 230(b) (policy objectives include “(1) to promote the continued 
development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media; 
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and 
other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation”); then citing Zeran, 
129 F.3d at 330). 
 61 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.  The court also specifically cited worry about potential abuse between 
users.  “Whenever one was displeased with the speech of another party conducted [online], the 
offended party could simply ‘notify’ the relevant service provider, claiming the information to be 
legally defamatory.”  Id.; see also Christina Mulligan, Technological Intermediaries and Freedom of 
the Press, 66 SMU L. REV. 157, 171 (2013); Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of 
Intermediary Immunity, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293, 317–18 (2011). 
 62 The term “collateral censorship” was coined by Professor Michael Meyerson.  Michael I.  
Meyerson, Authors, Editors, and Uncommon Carriers: Identifying the “Speaker” Within the New 
Media, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79, 118 (1995). 
 63 Cf. J.M. Balkin, Essay, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 
2298 (1999). 
 64 For a comprehensive cataloging of § 230 cases with context and commentary, see Eric  
Goldman, Ten Worst Section 230 Rulings of 2016 (Plus the Five Best), TECH. & MARKETING L. 
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rejected motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under § 230 on 
the basis of plaintiffs’ allegations that Google acted in bad faith.65  At 
the same time, other courts have made powerful decisions in favor of 
broad § 230 immunity and publishers’ rights to moderate content.  No-
tably, in Doe v. Backpage.com,66 the First Circuit expressly held that 
§ 230 protects the choices of websites as speakers and publishers, stat-
ing: “Congress did not sound an uncertain trumpet when it enacted the 
CDA, and it chose to grant broad protections to internet publishers.  
Showing that a website operates through a meretricious business model 
is not enough to strip away those protections.”67  The continued confu-
sion about § 230’s interpretation — as seen in current courts’ split on 
the importance of a business’s motivations for content moderation — 
demonstrates that the stakes around such questions have only grown 
since the foundational decision in Zeran. 
B.  First Amendment Implications 
The debate over how to balance the right of intermediaries to curate 
a platform while simultaneously protecting user speech under the First 
Amendment is ongoing for courts and scholars.  Depending on the type 
of intermediary involved, courts have analogized platforms to estab-
lished doctrinal areas in First Amendment law — company towns, 
broadcasters, editors — and the rights and obligations of a platform shift 
depending on which analogy is applied. 
The first of these analogies reasons that platforms are acting like the 
state, so the First Amendment directly constrains them.  While courts 
have established that only state action creates affirmative obligations 
under the First Amendment, determining exactly when a private party’s 
behavior constitutes state action is a more difficult question.68  The  
Supreme Court foundationally addressed this distinction between pri-
vate and state actors for First Amendment purposes in Marsh v.  
Alabama.69  In Marsh, a Jehovah’s Witness was arrested for criminal 
trespass for distributing literature on the sidewalk of a company town 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
BLOG (Jan. 4, 2017), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/01/ten-worst-section-230-rulings-of-
2016-plus-the-five-best.htm [https://perma.cc/KL48-B6GJ]. 
 65 Darnaa, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 15-cv-03221, 2016 WL 6540452 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2016); 
Spy Phone Labs LLC v. Google Inc., No. 15-cv-03756, 2016 WL 6025469 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2016); 
see also Eric Goldman, Google Loses Two Section 230(c)(2) Rulings — Spy Phone v. Google and 
Darnaa v. Google, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Nov. 8, 2016), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/ 
archives/2016/11/google-loses-two-section-230c2-rulings-spy-phone-v-google-and-darnaa-v-google. 
htm [https://perma.cc/TR72-9XZU]. 
 66 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016). 
 67 Id. at 29. 
 68 See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513–21 (1976). 
 69 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
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wholly owned by a corporation.70  The Court found that “[e]xcept for 
[ownership by a private corporation, this town] has all the characteris-
tics of any other American town.”71  Accordingly, the Court held the 
town was functionally equivalent to a state actor and obligated to guar-
antee First Amendment rights.72 
In the years since Marsh, the Court has continued to explore the 
“public function” circumstances necessary for private property to be 
treated as public.  Many of these cases have arisen in the context of 
shopping malls, where the Court has struggled to establish consistent 
reasoning on when a private individual’s First Amendment rights trump 
the rights of the owner of a private forum.73  The most expansive of 
these was Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan  
Valley Plaza, Inc.,74 which held a shopping mall to be the equivalent of 
the company town in Marsh and therefore allowed picketers to protest 
there.75  In overruling Logan Valley in Hudgens v. NLRB,76 the Court 
revised its assessment of a shopping mall as a public square and stated 
that a business does not qualify as performing a public function merely 
because it is open to the public.77  Instead, in order to qualify as per-
forming a public function, a business must be actually doing a job nor-
mally done by the government, as was the case with the company town 
in Marsh.78 
For a long time, the claim that online intermediaries are state actors 
or perform a public function and, thus, are subject to providing free 
speech guarantees, was a losing one.  In establishing platforms as non-
state actors, courts distinguished the facts in Marsh and its progeny, 
stating that intermediaries providing services like email, hosting, or 
search engines do not rise to the level of “performing any municipal 
power or essential public service and, therefore, do[] not stand in the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 70 Id. at 502–03. 
 71 Id. at 502. 
 72 Id. at 508–09. 
 73 See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Emps. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 
308, 318 (1968) (equating a private shopping center to a business district and affirming the right to 
picket in it), narrowed by Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 563–64 (1972) (holding speech in a 
mall is not constitutionally protected unless there are no other means of communication), overruled 
by Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 518.  The California Supreme Court granted more expansive free speech 
guarantees than those provided by the First Amendment in Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 
172 P.3d 742, 749 (Cal. 2007), and Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center, 592 P.2d 341, 344, 347 
(Cal. 1979).  See also Developments in the Law — State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 
123 HARV. L. REV. 1248, 1303–07 (2010). 
 74 391 U.S. 308. 
 75 Id. at 318. 
 76 424 U.S. 507. 
 77 Id. at 519 (quoting Lloyd Corp., 407 U.S. at 568–69). 
 78 Id. 
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shoes of the State.”79  While these cases have not been explicitly over-
turned, the Court’s recent ruling in Packingham v. North Carolina80 
might breathe new life into the application of state action doctrine to 
internet platforms. 
In Packingham, the Court struck down a North Carolina statute bar-
ring registered sex offenders from platforms like Facebook and  
Twitter.81  In his opinion for the court, Justice Kennedy reasoned that 
foreclosing “access to social media altogether is to prevent the user from 
engaging in the legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights.”82  De-
scribing such services as a “modern public square,” Justice Kennedy also 
acknowledged their essential nature to speech, calling them “perhaps the 
most powerful mechanisms available to a private citizen to make his or 
her voice heard.”83  Though the decision is limited in that it applies only 
to total exclusion, the sweeping language makes access to private online 
platforms a First Amendment right, leaving open the questions of how 
robust that access must be or where in the internet pipeline a choke 
point must lie in order to abridge a First Amendment right.  Future 
litigation might use Packingham’s acknowledgment of a First  
Amendment right to social media access as a new basis to argue that 
these platforms perform quasi-municipal functions. 
Separate from the issue of state action, Packingham’s acknowledg-
ment of platforms as private forums that significantly affect the expres-
sive conduct of other private parties implicates other areas of regulation 
that are consistent with the First Amendment.  This can be seen in the 
doctrine around other types of speech conduits, like radio and television 
broadcasters.  In such cases, the Court has upheld regulation of radio 
broadcasting, despite the broadcast station’s claims that the regulation 
unconstitutionally infringed on its editorial judgment and speech.84  A 
public right to “suitable access” to ideas and a scarce radio spectrum 
justified the agency rule that required broadcasters to present public 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 79 Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 442 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (distin-
guishing AOL’s email service from the kind of “municipal powers or public services” provided by a 
private company town that made it liable as a state actor in Marsh); see also Green v. Am. Online, 
318 F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that, as a private company and not a state actor, AOL is 
not subject to constitutional free speech requirements); Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 
622, 631 (D. Del. 2007) (finding that for the purposes of constitutional free speech guarantees, 
Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft are private companies, even though they work with state actors like 
public universities). 
 80 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017). 
 81 Id. at 1733, 1738. 
 82 Id. at 1737. 
 83 Id. 
 84 See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
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issues and give each side of those issues fair coverage.85  In the years 
following, the Court has limited this holding,86 while also extending it 
to the realm of broadcast television in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. 
v. FCC.87 
The question of whether internet intermediaries would fall in the 
same category as radio or broadcast television was addressed by the 
Court in Reno.  The Court found that the elements that justify television 
and radio regulation — those mediums’ “invasive” nature, history of 
extensive regulation, and the scarcity of frequencies — “are not present 
in cyberspace” and explicitly exempted the internet from the doctrine 
established in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC88 and Turner.89  While 
it is unclear how the Court would draw the line between the internet 
functions of concern in Reno and the growth of social media platforms, 
Packingham’s emphasis on the right to platform access might revive the 
concerns over scarcity raised by these cases. 
The final First Amendment analogy relevant to online speech rea-
sons that platforms themselves exercise an important expressive role in 
the world, so the First Amendment actively protects them from state 
interference.  This draws on the doctrine giving special First  
Amendment protections to newspapers under Miami Herald Publishing 
Co. v. Tornillo.90  There, in a unanimous decision, the Court found a 
Florida statute that gave political candidates a “right to reply” in local 
newspapers unconstitutional under the Free Press Clause of the First 
Amendment.91  Though the “right to reply” legislation was akin to FCC 
fairness regulations upheld in Red Lion, the Tornillo Court found the 
statute unconstitutional.92  The Court reasoned that the statute was an 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 85 Id. at 400–01 (“In view of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, the Government’s role in 
allocating those frequencies, and the legitimate claims of those unable without governmental assis-
tance to gain access to those frequencies for expression of their views, we hold the regulations and 
ruling at issue here are both authorized by statute and constitutional.”). 
 86 See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984) (holding publicly funded 
broadcasters have First Amendment protections to editorialize); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 
726, 741 n.17 (1978) (stating “it is well settled that the First Amendment has a special meaning in 
the broadcasting context” and citing Red Lion); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l 
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 120–21 (1973) (holding broadcasters are not under an obligation to sell adver-
tising time to a political party). 
 87 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 185 (1997); Turner Broad. Sys., 
Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 638–39 (1994).  In these cases the Court dealt with FCC “must 
carry” regulations imposed on cable television companies.  In Turner I, the Court determined that 
cable television companies were indeed First Amendment speakers, 512 U.S. at 656, but in Turner 
II, it held that the “must carry” provisions of the FCC did not violate those rights, 520 U.S. at  
224–25. 
 88 395 U.S. 367. 
 89 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868–70 (1997). 
 90 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
 91 Id. at 247, 258. 
 92 Id. at 258. 
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“intrusion into the function of editors”93 and that “press responsibility is 
not mandated by the Constitution and . . . cannot be legislated.”94  As 
internet intermediaries have become more and more vital to speech, 
First Amendment advocates have urged courts to apply the holding in 
Tornillo to platforms, granting them their own speech rights.95  The 
Court’s new definition in Packingham of online speech platforms as  
forums, however, might threaten the viability of arguments that these 
companies have their own First Amendment rights as speakers. 
C.  Internet Pessimists, Optimists, and Realists 
As have the courts, scholars have struggled with the question of how 
to balance users’ First Amendment right to speech against intermediar-
ies’ right to curate platforms.  Many look to platforms as a new market 
for speech and ideas.  In the early days of the internet, Professor Jack 
Balkin could have been considered an internet optimist.  He saw the 
internet and its wealth of publishing tools, which enable widespread 
digital speech, as enhancing the “possibility of democratic culture.”96  
More recently, he has recognized that private control of these tools poses 
threats to free speech and democracy.97  Professor Yochai Benkler could 
also have been considered an optimist, though a more cautious one.  He 
has posited looking at the internet as enabling new methods of infor-
mation production, as well as a move from traditional industrial- 
dominated markets to more collaborative peer production.98  Professor  
Lawrence Lessig acknowledges that while the internet creates exciting 
new means to regulate through code, he is concerned about corporations 
and platforms having great unchecked power to regulate the internet 
and all interactions that fall under § 230 immunity.99  Professors James 
Boyle, Jack Goldsmith, and Tim Wu have had similar concerns about 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 256. 
 95 See Eric Goldman, Revisiting Search Engine Bias, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 96, 108–10 
(2011); Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search 
Results, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/ 
05/SearchEngineFirstAmendment.pdf [https://perma.cc/U27F-MA6U].  But see James Grimmelmann,  
Some Skepticism About Search Neutrality, in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE 
FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 435 (Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus eds., 2010); Frank Pasquale, 
Platform Neutrality: Enhancing Freedom of Expression in Spheres of Private Power, 17 THEO-
RETICAL INQUIRIES L. 487, 502–03 (2016) (refuting efforts to apply Tornillo to internet  
intermediaries). 
 96 Balkin, supra note 7, at 45–46. 
 97 See Balkin, supra note 11, at 2300–01. 
 98 See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006); Yochai Benkler, 
Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, 66 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 181–82 (2003). 
 99 See generally LESSIG, supra note 21; Lawrence Lessig, Commentary, The Law of the Horse: 
What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999). 
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the state coopting private online intermediaries for enforcement.100   
Professor David Post has argued that the market will resolve corporate 
monopolization of speech.  He has suggested that such corporate com-
petition between individual online platforms would result in a “market 
for rules,” which would allow users to seek networks that have speech 
and conduct “rule sets” to their liking.101 
Not quite optimists or pessimists, many internet scholars have fo-
cused their work on the realities of what the internet is, the harms it 
does and can create, and the best ways to resolve those harms.  Professor 
Danielle Keats Citron was an early advocate for this approach.  She has 
argued for recognition of cyber civil rights in order to circumvent § 230 
immunity without removing the benefits of its protection.102  Professor 
Mary Anne Franks has continued this tack, and argues that the nature 
of online space can amplify speech harms, especially in the context of 
sexual harassment.103  Online hate speech, harassment, bullying, and 
revenge porn have slightly different solutions within these models.  Both 
Citron and Professor Helen Norton have argued that hate speech is now 
mainstream and should be actively addressed by platforms that have 
the most power to curtail it.104  Emily Bazelon argues that the rise of 
online bullying calls for a more narrow reading of § 230.105  Citron and 
Franks respectively suggest either an amendment or a court-created 
narrowing of § 230 for sites that host revenge porn.106 
This is where we stand today in understanding internet intermedi-
aries: amidst a § 230 dilemma (is it about enabling platforms to edit their 
sites or about protecting users from collateral censorship?), a First 
Amendment enigma (what are online platforms for the purposes of 
speech — a company town, a broadcaster, or an editor?), and conflicting 
scholarly theories of how best to understand speech on the internet. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 100 See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? (2006); 
James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors, 66 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 177 (1997); see also Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 
1267 (2017) (discussing how the state is using online platforms to enforce consumer protection and 
generally regulate markets in place of legal rules). 
 101 David G. Post, Anarchy, State, and the Internet: An Essay on Law-Making in Cyberspace, 
1995 J. ONLINE L. art. 3, para. 42.  But see Frank Pasquale, Privacy, Antitrust, and Power, 20 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 1009 (2013) (arguing that platforms like Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and 
Instagram are complements, not substitutes, for one another). 
 102 See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014); Danielle Keats 
Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 115–25 (2009). 
 103 Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655, 678, 681–83 (2012). 
 104 Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering Digital 
Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1456–68 (2011). 
 105 See generally EMILY BAZELON, STICKS AND STONES: DEFEATING THE CULTURE OF 
BULLYING AND REDISCOVERING THE POWER OF CHARACTER AND EMPATHY (2013);  
Bazelon, supra note 28. 
 106 Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 345, 359 n.86 (2014). 
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Missing from the debate around § 230 is the answer to a simple 
question: given that these platforms have § 230 immunity, why are they 
bothering to edit?  Administrative law scholarship discusses the forces 
that motivate private actors to voluntarily self-regulate.107  Some firms 
or industries have developed self-regulation alongside government reg-
ulation.108  Others see self-regulation as an optimal form of business and 
company management.109  And some decide to self-regulate as an at-
tempt to preempt eventual government regulation.110  Some of these 
reasons come to bear on platform motivation, but because of immunity 
under § 230, most are irrelevant.  Instead, through historical interviews 
and archived materials, Part II argues that platforms have created a 
voluntary system of self-regulation because they are economically moti-
vated to create a hospitable environment for their users in order to in-
centivize engagement.111  This self-regulation involves both reflecting 
the norms of their users around speech as well as keeping up as much 
speech as possible.  Online platforms also self-regulate for reasons of 
social and corporate responsibility, which in turn reflect free speech 
norms.112  These motivations reflect both the Good Samaritan incentives 
and collateral censorship concerns underlying § 230. 
A question is also missing from the debate about how to classify 
platforms in terms of First Amendment doctrine: what are major online 
intermediaries actually doing to regulate content on their sites?  The 
next Part discusses why platforms are making the decisions to moderate 
along such a fine line, while the following Part demonstrates how plat-
forms moderate content through a detailed set of rules, trained human 
decisionmaking, and reasoning by analogy, all influenced by a pluralistic 
system of internal and external actors. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 107 See Freeman, supra note 15, at 644–49; Michael, supra note 15, at 203–40. 
 108 See, e.g., JOSEPH V. REES, HOSTAGES OF EACH OTHER: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
NUCLEAR SAFETY SINCE THREE MILE ISLAND 1–2 (1994) (documenting private use of self-
regulation in an industrial area following disaster). 
 109 See generally DENNIS C. KINLAW, CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT AND MEASUREMENT 
FOR TOTAL QUALITY (1992) (describing self-regulation, specifically through the use of total qual-
ity management and self-auditing, as the best technique for business management and means of 
achieving customer satisfaction). 
 110 See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 142–57 (1989) (discussing private actors’ de-
cisions to self-regulate in order to avoid potential government regulation). 
 111 See Citron & Norton, supra note 104, at 1454 (discussing how some intermediaries regulate 
hate speech because they see it as a threat to profits). 
 112 Id. at 1455 (discussing how some intermediaries regulate hate speech because they see it as a 
corporate or social responsibility). 
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II.  WHY GOVERN WELL? THE ROLE OF FREE SPEECH NORMS, 
CORPORATE CULTURE, AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF CONTENT MODERATION 
In the earliest days of the internet, the regulations concerning the 
substance and structure of cyberspace were “built by a noncommercial 
sector [of] researchers and hackers, focused upon building a network.”113  
Advances in technology as well as the immunity created for internet 
intermediaries under § 230 led to a new generation of cyberspace.  It 
included collaborative public platforms like Wikipedia,114 but it was 
also populated largely by private commercial platforms.115 
As this online space developed, scholars considered what normative 
values were being built into the infrastructure of the internet.  Lessig 
ascribed a constitutional architecture to the internet “not to describe a 
hundred-day plan[, but] instead to identify the values that a space 
should guarantee. . . . [W]e are simply asking: What values should be 
protected there?  What values should be built into the space to encour-
age what forms of life?”116  Writing five years later in 2004,117 Balkin 
argued that the values of cyberspace are inherently democratic — bol-
stered by the ideals of free speech, individual liberty, and participa-
tion.118  Both Lessig and Balkin placed the fate of “free speech values”119 
and the “freedoms and controls of cyberspace”120 in the hands of code 
and architecture online.121  “[A] code of cyberspace, defining the free-
doms and controls of cyberspace, will be built,” wrote Lessig.122  “About 
that there can be no debate.  But by whom, and with what values?  That 
is the only choice we have left to make.”123 
There was not much choice about it, but over the last fifteen years, 
three American companies — YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter — have 
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established themselves as dominant platforms in global content sharing 
and online speech.124  These platforms are both the architecture for pub-
lishing new speech and the architects of the institutional design that 
governs it.  Because of the wide immunity granted by § 230, these ar-
chitects are free to choose which values they want to protect — or to 
protect no values at all.  So why have they chosen to integrate values 
into their platform?  And what values have been integrated? 
It might first be useful to describe what governance means in the 
context of these platforms.  “The term ‘governance’ is popular but im-
precise,” and modern use does not assume “governance as a synonym 
for government.”125  Rather, “new governance model[s]” identify several 
features that accurately describe the interplay between user and  
platform: a “dynamic” and “iterative” “law-making process”;126 “norm-
generating” “[i]ndividuals”;127 and “convergence of processes and  
outcomes.”128  This is the way in which this Article uses the term “gov-
ernance.”  However, the user-platform relationship departs from even 
this definition because of its private and centralized but also pluralisti-
cally networked nature.  And it departs even further from other uses of 
the term “governance,” including “corporate governance” (describing it 
as centralized management) and public service definitions of “good gov-
ernance” (describing states with “independent judicial system[s] and le-
gal framework[s]”).129 
This Part explores this question through archived material and a se-
ries of interviews with the policy executives charged with creating the 
moderation systems for YouTube and Facebook.  It concludes that three 
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main factors influenced the development of these platforms’ moderation 
systems: (1) an underlying belief in free speech norms; (2) a sense of 
corporate responsibility; and (3) the necessity of meeting users’ norms 
for economic viability. 
A.  Platforms’ Baseline in Free Speech 
Conversations with the people who were in charge of creating the 
content-moderation regimes at these platforms reveal that they were in-
deed influenced by the concerns about user free speech and collateral 
censorship raised in Zeran. 
1.  Free Speech Norms. — For those closely following the develop-
ment of online regulation, § 230 and Zeran were obvious foundational 
moments for internet speech.  But at the time, many online commercial 
platforms did not think of themselves as related to speech at all.  As a 
young First Amendment lawyer in the Bay Area, Nicole Wong was an 
active witness to the development of private internet companies’ speech 
policies.130  In the first few years of widespread internet use, Wong re-
called that very few lawyers were focusing on the responsibilities that 
commercial online companies and platforms might have toward moder-
ating speech.131  But as most major print newspapers began posting 
content on websites between 1996 and 1998, the overlap between speech 
and the internet became more noticeable.132  Likewise, just as more tra-
ditional publishing platforms for speech were finding their place on the 
internet, new internet companies were discovering that they were not 
just software companies, but that they were also publishing plat-
forms.133  At first, Wong’s clients were experiencing speech as only a 
secondary effect of their primary business, as in the case of Silicon  
Investor, a day-trading site that was having issues with the content pub-
lished on its message boards.134  Others, like Yahoo, were actively rec-
ognizing that online speech was an intractable part of their business 
models.135  Despite this reality, the transition to thinking of themselves 
as speech platforms was still slow.  “They had just gone public,” Wong 
said of her representation of early Yahoo.  “They had only two lawyers 
in their legal department. . . . [N]either had any background in First 
Amendment law or content moderation or privacy.  They were corporate 
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lawyers.”136  The problem identified by Wong was that these new inter-
net corporations still thought of themselves as software companies — 
they did not think about “the lingering effects of speech as part of what 
they were doing.”137  In facing these new challenges, Wong had become 
one of the few people not only in Silicon Valley, but also in the United 
States, capable of advising on these challenges, with her background in 
First Amendment doctrine, communications, and electronic privacy.138 
Wong’s expertise led her to join Google full time in 2004.  In October 
2006, Google acquired YouTube, the popular online video site, and 
Wong was put in charge of creating and implementing content- 
moderation policies.139  Creating the policies regarding what type of 
content would be acceptable on YouTube had an important free speech 
baseline: legal content would not be removed unless it violated site 
rules.140  Wong and her content-moderation team actively worked to try 
to make sure these rules did not result in overcensorship of user speech.  
One such moment occurred in late December 2006, when two videos of 
Saddam Hussein’s hanging surfaced on YouTube shortly after his death.  
One video contained grainy footage of the hanging itself; the other con-
tained video of Hussein’s corpse in the morgue.  Both videos violated 
YouTube’s community guidelines at the time — though for slightly dif-
ferent reasons.  “The question was whether to keep either of them up,” 
said Wong, “and we decided to keep the one of the hanging itself, be-
cause we felt from a historical perspective it had real value.”141  The 
second video was deemed “gratuitous violence” and removed from the 
site.142  A similarly significant exception occurred in June 2009, when a 
video of a dying Iranian Green Movement protestor shot in the chest 
and bleeding from the eyes was ultimately kept on YouTube because of 
its political significance.143  YouTube’s policies and internal guidelines 
on violence were altered to allow for the exception.144  In 2007, a video 
was uploaded to YouTube of a man being brutally beaten by four men 
in a cell and was removed for gratuitous violence in violation of 
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YouTube’s community guidelines.145  Shortly after, however, it was re-
stored by Wong and her team after journalists and protestors contacted 
YouTube to explain that the video was posted by Egyptian human rights 
activist Wael Abbas to inform the international community of human 
rights violations by the police in Egypt.146 
At Facebook, there was a similar slow move to organize platform 
policies on user speech.  It was not until November 2009, five years after 
the site was founded, that Facebook created a team of about twelve 
people to specialize in content moderation.147  Like YouTube, Facebook 
hired a lawyer, Jud Hoffman, to head their Online Operations team as 
Global Policy Manager.  Hoffman recalled that, “when I got there, my 
role didn’t exist.”148  Hoffman was charged with creating a group sepa-
rate from operations that would formalize and consolidate an ad hoc 
draft of rules and ensure that Facebook was transparent with users by 
publishing a set of “Community Standards.”149  The team consisted of 
six people in addition to Hoffman, notably Dave Willner, who had cre-
ated a first draft of these “all-encompassing” rules, which contained 
roughly 15,000 words.150 
At Twitter, the company established an early policy not to police user 
content, except in certain circumstances, and rigorously defended that 
right.151  Adherence to this ethos led to Twitter’s early reputation among 
social media platforms as “the free speech wing of the free speech 
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party.”152  It also meant that unlike YouTube and Facebook, which ac-
tively took on content moderation of their users’ content, Twitter devel-
oped no internal content-moderation process for taking down and re-
viewing content.  The devotion to a fundamental free speech standard 
was reflected not only in what Twitter did not do to police user content, 
but also in what it did to protect it.  Alexander Macgillivray joined 
Twitter as General Counsel in September 2009, a position he held for 
four years.153  In that time, Macgillivray regularly resisted government 
requests for user information and user takedown.  “We value the repu-
tation we have for defending and respecting the user’s voice,”  
Macgillivray stated in 2012.154  “We think it’s important to our company 
and the way users think about whether to use Twitter, as compared to 
other services.”155 
A common theme exists in all three of these platforms’ histories: 
American lawyers trained and acculturated in American free speech 
norms and First Amendment law oversaw the development of company 
content-moderation policy.  Though they might not have “directly im-
ported First Amendment doctrine,” the normative background in free 
speech had a direct impact on how they structured their policies.156  
Wong, Hoffman, and Willner all described being acutely aware of their 
predisposition to American democratic culture, which put a large em-
phasis on free speech and American cultural norms.  Simultaneously, 
there were complicated implications in trying to implement those  
American democratic cultural norms within a global company.  “We 
were really conscious of not just wholesale adopting a kind of U.S. ju-
risprudence free expression approach,” said Hoffman.157  “[We would] 
try to step back and focus on the mission [of the company].”158   
Facebook’s mission is to “[g]ive people the power to build community 
and bring the world closer together.”159  But even this, Willner acknowl-
edged, is “not a cultural-neutral mission. . . . The idea that the world 
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should be more open and connected is not something that, for example, 
North Korea agrees with.”160 
2.  Government Request and Collateral Censorship Concerns. — Be-
yond holding general beliefs in the right to users’ free speech, these plat-
forms have also implemented policies to protect user speech from the 
threat of government request and collateral censorship.161 
Twitter’s early pushback to government requests related to its users’ 
content is well documented.  In his time as General Counsel, Macgillivray 
regularly resisted government requests for user information and user 
takedown.  In January 2011, he successfully resisted a federal gag order 
over a subpoena in a grand jury investigation into Wikileaks.162  
“[T]here’s not yet a culture of companies standing up for users when 
governments and companies come knocking with subpoenas looking for 
user data or to unmask an anonymous commenter who says mean things 
about a company or the local sheriff,” said Wired of Twitter’s resistance 
to the gag order.163  “Twitter deserves recognition for its principled up-
holding of the spirit of the First Amendment.”164  Despite the victory 
over the gag order, Twitter was eventually forced to turn over data to 
the Justice Department after exhausting all its appeals.165  A similar 
scenario played out in New York, when a judge ordered Twitter to sup-
ply all the Twitter posts of Malcolm Harris, an Occupy Wall Street pro-
tester charged with disorderly conduct.166  There, too, Twitter lost, but 
not before full resort to the appeals process.167 
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Wong also described regularly fighting government requests to take 
down certain content, collateral censorship, and the problems with ap-
plying American free speech norms globally.  For example, in November 
2006, the Thai government announced that it would block YouTube to 
anyone using a Thai IP address unless Google removed twenty offensive 
videos from the site.168  While some of the videos “clearly violated the 
YouTube terms of service,” others simply featured Photoshopped images 
of the King of Thailand with feet on his head.169  In Thailand, insulting 
the King was illegal and punishable by as much as fifteen years in 
prison.170  Nicole Wong was hard pressed to find the content offensive.  
“My first instinct was it’s a cartoon.  It’s a stupid Photoshop,” she stated, 
“but then it suddenly became a kind of learning moment for me about in-
ternational speech standards versus First Amendment speech standards 
and there was a lot more American First Amendment exceptionalism [in 
that space] than previously.”171  Wong traveled to Thailand to resolve 
the dispute and was overwhelmed by the popular love she observed in 
the Thai people for their King.  “You can’t even imagine [their love for 
their King],” she recounted of the trip: 
Every Monday literally eighty-five percent of the people show up to work 
in a gold or yellow shirt and dress172 and there’s a historical reason for it: 
the only source of stability in this country is this King . . . They absolutely 
revere their King. . . . Someone at the U.S. Embassy described him as a 
“blend of George Washington, Jesus, and Elvis.”  Some people . . . tears 
came to their eyes as they talked about the insults to the King and how 
much it offended them.  That’s the part that set me back.  Who am I, a U.S. 
attorney sitting in California to tell them: “No, we’re not taking that down.  
You’re going to have to live with that.”173 
After the trip, Wong and her colleagues agreed to remove the videos 
within the geographical boundaries of Thailand, with the exception of 
critiques of the military.174 
A few months later, events similar to those in Thailand emerged, but 
ended in a different result.  In March 2007, Turkey blocked access to 
YouTube for all Turkish users in response to a judge-mandated order.175  
The judgment came in response to a parody news broadcast that jok-
ingly quipped that the founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal  
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Atatürk, was gay.176  As with the King in Thailand, ridicule or insult of 
Atatürk was illegal in Turkey.  Though the video had already been vol-
untarily removed, Turkey had searched and provided Google with a list 
of dozens of similarly offensive videos and demanded their takedown.177  
Unwilling to meet the blanket demand, Wong and her colleagues at 
Google found themselves parsing the intricacies of Turkish law on def-
amation of Atatürk, measuring those standards against the videos high-
lighted as offensive by the Turkish government, and then offering com-
promises to ban in Turkey only those videos that they found actually 
violated Turkish law.178  This seemed to strike an accord for a period of 
time.179  A little over a year later, however, in June 2007, the Turkish 
government demanded Google ban access to all such videos not only in 
Turkey, but worldwide.180  Google refused, and Turkey subsequently 
blocked YouTube throughout Turkey.181 
All three platforms faced the issue of free speech concerns versus 
censorship directly through platform rules or collateral censorship by 
government request when a video called Innocence of Muslims was up-
loaded to YouTube.182  Subtitled “The Real Life of Muhammad,” the 
video depicts Muslims burning the homes of Egyptian Christians, before 
cutting to “cartoonish” images that paint Muhammad as a bastard, ho-
mosexual, womanizer, and violent bully.183  The video’s negative depic-
tion of the Muslim faith sparked a firestorm of outrage in the Islamic 
world and fostered anti-Western sentiment.184  As violence moved from 
Libya to Egypt, YouTube issued a statement that while the video would 
remain posted on the site because the content was “clearly within [its] 
guidelines,” access to the video would be temporarily restricted in Libya 
and Egypt.185 
At Facebook, the debate between violation of platform guidelines 
versus concerns over collateral censorship also played out.  By the time 
the video was posted, many of Facebook’s difficulties with hate speech 
had been distilled into a single rule: attacks on institutions (for example, 
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countries, religions, or leaders) would be considered permissible content 
and stay up, but attacks on groups (people of a certain religion, race, or 
country) would be taken down.186  In application, this meant that state-
ments like “I hate Islam” were permissible on Facebook, while “I hate 
Muslims” was not.  Hoffman, Willner, and their team watched the video, 
found no violative statements against Muslims, and decided to keep it 
on the site.187  A few weeks later, the Obama Administration called on 
YouTube to reconsider leaving the video up, in part to quell the violence 
abroad.188  Both YouTube and Facebook stuck to their decisions.189  Re-
viewing this moment in history, Professor Jeffrey Rosen spoke to the 
significance of their decisions for collateral censorship: “In this case . . . 
the mobs fell well outside of U.S. jurisdiction, and the link between the 
video and potential violence also wasn’t clear. . . . Had YouTube made 
a different decision . . . millions of viewers across the globe [would have 
been denied] access to a newsworthy story and the chance to form their 
own opinions.”190 
The early history and personnel of these companies demonstrate how 
American free speech norms and concerns over censorship became in-
stilled in the speech policies of these companies.  But they also raise a 
new question: if all three companies had § 230 immunity and all valued 
their users’ free speech rights, why did they bother curating at all? 
B.  Why Moderate At All? 
These online platforms have broad freedom to shape online expres-
sion and a demonstrated interest in free speech values.  So why do they 
bother to create intricate content-moderation systems to remove 
speech?191  Why go to the trouble to take down and then reinstate videos 
of violence like those Wong described?  Why not just keep them up in 
the first place?  The answers to these questions lead to the incentives 
for platforms to minimize online obscenity put in place by the Good 
Samaritan provision of § 230.  Platforms create rules and systems to 
curate speech out of a sense of corporate social responsibility, but also, 
more importantly, because their economic viability depends on meeting 
users’ speech and community norms. 
1.  Corporate Responsibility and Identity. — Some platforms choose 
to moderate content that is obscene, violent, or hate speech out of a sense 
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of corporate responsibility.192  At YouTube, Wong looked to the values 
of the company in addition to American free speech norms in developing 
an approach to content moderation.193  “Not everyone has to be a free-
wheeling, free speech platform that is the left wing of the left wing party,” 
she said, referring to Twitter’s unofficial content-moderation policy: 
But you get to decide what the tone and tenor of your platform look[] like, 
and that’s a First Amendment right in and of itself.  Yahoo or Google had 
a strong orientation toward free speech, [and] being more permissive of a 
wide range of ideas and the way those ideas are expressed, they created 
community guidelines to set what [users] can come here for, because they 
want the largest possible audience to join.194 
Like Wong, Hoffman and Willner considered the mission of  
Facebook — “to make the world more open and connected”195 — and 
found that it often aligned with larger American free speech and demo-
cratic values.196  These philosophies were balanced against competing 
principles of user safety, harm to users, public relations concerns for 
Facebook, and the revenue implications of certain content for advertis-
ers.197  The balance often favored free speech ideals of “leaving content 
up” while at the same time trying to figure out new approaches or rules 
that would still satisfy concerned users and encourage them to connect 
and interact on the platform.198  “We felt like Facebook was the most 
important platform for this kind of communication, and we felt like it 
was our responsibility to figure out an answer to this,” said Hoffman.199 
Likewise, Twitter’s corporate philosophy of freedom of speech justi-
fied its failure to moderate content.200  In recent years, Twitter’s ap-
proach has started to change.  In a Washington Post editorial, the new 
General Counsel of Twitter, Vijaya Gadde, used very different rhetoric 
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than that of her predecessor: “Freedom of expression means little as our 
underlying philosophy if we continue to allow voices to be silenced be-
cause they are afraid to speak up,” wrote Gadde.201  “We need to do a 
better job combating abuse without chilling or silencing speech.”202  
Over the last two years, the company has slowly made good on its prom-
ise, putting a number of policies and tools in place to make it easier for 
users to filter and hide content they do not want to see.203 
2.  Economic Reasons. — Though corporate responsibility is a noble 
aim, the primary reason companies take down obscene and violent ma-
terial is the threat that allowing such material poses to potential profits 
based in advertising revenue.204  Platforms’ “sense of the bottom-line 
benefits of addressing hate speech can be shaped by consumers’ — i.e., 
users’ — expectations.”205  If a platform creates a site that matches us-
ers’ expectations, users will spend more time on the site and advertising 
revenue will increase.206  Take down too much content and you lose not 
only the opportunity for interaction, but also the potential trust of users.  
Likewise, keeping up all content on a site risks making users uncomfort-
able and losing page views and revenue.  According to Willner and  
Hoffman, this theory underlies much of the economic rationale behind  
Facebook’s extensive moderation policies.207  As Willner stated, “Facebook 
is profitable only because when you add up a lot of tiny interactions 
worth nothing, it is suddenly worth billions of dollars.”208  Wong spoke 
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of the challenge to meet users’ expectations online slightly differently: 
as platforms attempting to catch up to changing social norms online.209  
Changing expectations about speech are happening both at the platform 
level, and also at a societal level, said Wong, who referred to the last 
twenty years of online speech as undergoing a “norm-setting process” 
that is developing at light speed in comparison to any other kind of 
publication platform.210  “What we’re still in the middle of is how do 
we think about . . . the norms of behavior when what’s appropriate is 
constantly reiterated,” said Wong.211  “If you layer over all of that the 
technology change and the cultural, racial, national, [and] global per-
spectives, it’s all just changing dramatically fast.  It’s enormously diffi-
cult to figure out those norms, let alone create policy to reflect them.”212  
Nevertheless, reflecting these rapidly changing norms, and, accordingly, 
encouraging and facilitating platform interactions — users posting, com-
menting, liking, and sharing content — is how platforms like Facebook 
and YouTube have stayed in business and where platforms like Twitter 
have run into trouble. 
Twitter’s transformation from internet hero for its blanket refusal to 
police users’ content to internet villain happened relatively swiftly.  
Though public awareness of online hate speech and harassment was 
already growing, the GamerGate controversy in 2014 raised new levels 
of global awareness about the issue.213  As the least policed or rule-based 
platform, much of the blame fell on Twitter.214  By 2015, the change in 
cultural values and expectations began to be reflected in new public 
standards and policy at Twitter.  The site added new language prohib-
iting “promot[ing] violence against others . . . on the basis of race, eth-
nicity, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, gender, gender iden-
tity, age, or disability” to the Twitter Rules and prohibited revenge 
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porn.215  On December 30, 2015, Twitter published a new set of Twitter 
Rules — which were largely nothing new, but rather an official incor-
poration of the separate pages and policies in one place.216  In January 
2016, one Twitter spokesperson described the changes: “Over the last 
year, we have clarified and tightened our policies to reduce abuse, in-
cluding prohibiting indirect threats and nonconsensual nude images.  
Striking the right balance will inevitably create tension, but user safety 
is critical to our mission at Twitter and our unwavering support for free-
dom of expression.”217 
In the mid-1990s, Post presciently wrote about how this interplay 
between users’ norms around speech and content of online platforms 
would play out.  Post suggested competition between individual online 
platforms would result in a “market for rules,” which would allow users 
to seek networks that have “rule sets” to their liking.218  At least with 
regard to Twitter, this platform-exit prediction is mostly accurate.  Over 
the last few years, many users unhappy with the policies of Twitter left 
the platform and favored other platforms like Facebook, Instagram, and 
Snapchat.219  As Twitter’s user growth stagnated, many blamed the 
site’s inability to police harassment, hate speech, and trolling on its site 
for the slump.220  In late 2016, Twitter announced a host of new services 
for users to control their experience online, block hate speech and har-
assment, and control trolls.221  Post’s idea of a “market for rules” is an 
incredibly useful heuristic to understand the history of online content 
moderation, with two small updates: (1) the history of Twitter reveals a 
nuance not fully predicted by Post — that is, rather than exit a platform, 
some users would stay and expect platforms to alter rule sets and policies 
reactively in response to user pressure; and (2) the “market for rules” 
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paradigm mistakes the commodity at stake in online platforms.  The 
commodity is not just the user, but rather it is the content created and 
engaged with by a user culture.222  In this sense there is no competition 
between social media platforms themselves, as Post suggests, because 
they are complementary, not substitute, goods.223 
Whether rooted in corporate social responsibility or profits, the de-
velopment of platforms’ content-moderation systems to reflect the nor-
mative expectations of users is precisely what the creation of the Good 
Samaritan provision in § 230 sought.  Moreover, the careful monitoring 
of these systems to ensure user speech is protected can be traced to the 
free speech concerns of § 230 outlined in Zeran.  The answer to the 
dilemma of what § 230 protects — immunity for good actors creating 
decency online or protection against collateral censorship — seems not 
to be an either/or answer.  Rather, both purposes seem to have an essen-
tial role to play in the balance of private moderation of online speech. 
With this new knowledge about the motivations behind platforms’ 
content-moderation systems, we can then ask the next question in the 
debate over internet intermediaries: how are platforms actually moder-
ating?  The answer to this question, explored in the next Part, is essential 
to understanding how platforms should — or should not — be under-
stood for the purposes of First Amendment law. 
III.  HOW ARE PLATFORMS GOVERNING? THE RULES, PROCESS, 
AND REVISION OF CONTENT-MODERATION SYSTEMS 
Much of the analysis over how to categorize online platforms with 
respect to the First Amendment is missing a hard look at what these 
platforms are actually doing and how they are doing it.  In part, this is 
because the private content-moderation systems of major platforms like 
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube are historically opaque.  This Part 
seeks to demonstrate how these systems actually work to moderate 
online speech.  In doing this, Part III looks at the history of how content-
moderation systems changed from those of standards to those of rules, 
how platforms enforce these rules, and how these rules are subject to 
change.  Many of these features bear remarkable resemblance to heuris-
tics and structures familiar in legal decisionmaking.  Despite these sim-
ilarities, platform features are best thought of not in terms of First 
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Amendment doctrine — as reflecting the role of a state actor, a broad-
caster, or a newspaper editor — but in terms of a private self-regulatory 
system to govern online speech. 
A.  Development of Moderation: From Standards to Rules 
When Dave Willner joined a small team to specialize in content mod-
eration in November 2009, no public “Community Standards” existed at 
Facebook.  Instead, all content moderation was based on one page of 
internal “rules” applied globally to all users.  Willner recalled that the 
moderation policies and guidance for enforcing them were limited.224  
“The [policy] guidance was about a page; a list of things you should 
delete: so it was things like Hitler and naked people.  None of those 
things were wrong, but there was no explicit framework for why those 
things were on the list.”225  Willner’s now-wife Charlotte was also work-
ing at Facebook doing customer service and content moderation and 
had been there for a year before Dave joined.226  She described the ethos 
of the pre-2008 moderation guidelines as “if it makes you feel bad in 
your gut, then go ahead and take it down.”227  She recalled that the “Feel 
bad? Take it down” rule was the bulk of her moderation training prior 
to the formation of Dave’s group in late 2008.228  Wong described a 
similar ethos in the early days at YouTube, especially around efforts to 
know when to remove graphic violence from the site.  Speaking of rein-
stating the 2007 video of the Egyptian protestor being brutally beaten,229 
Wong said: “It had no title on it.  It wasn’t posted by him. . . . I had no 
way of knowing what it was and I had taken something down that had 
real significance as a human rights document.  So we put it back up.  
And then we had to create another exception to the no-violence rule.”230 
Though both Wong and the Willners used the term “rule” in describ-
ing these prescriptions for takedown, a more precise term for these early 
guidelines might be “standard.”  In legal theory, the “rules-standards 
conflict” describes the battle between two formal resolutions for legal 
controversy.231  An example of a standard is “don’t drive too fast.”  An 
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example of a rule is a speed limit set at sixty-five miles per hour.  There 
are trade-offs to picking one as the formal solution over the other.  
Standards are often “restatements of purpose” or values,232 but because 
they are often vague and open ended, they can be “subject to arbitrary 
and/or prejudiced enforcement” by decisionmakers.233  This purposive 
approach, however, can also mean that standards are enforced precisely 
and efficiently and can be more accommodating to changing circum-
stances.  Rules, on the other hand, have the issues reverse to those of 
standards.  Rules are comparatively cheap and easy to enforce, but they 
can be over- and underinclusive and, thus, can lead to unfair results.234  
Rules permit little discretion and in this sense limit the whims of deci-
sionmakers, but they also can contain gaps and conflicts, creating com-
plexity and litigation.235 
Whichever approach is used, a central point is that the principles 
formalized in rules and standards are rooted in the social norms and 
values of a community.236  Standards are more direct analogues of val-
ues or purpose but “require[] that the enforcing community . . . come to 
some consensus on the meaning of a value term.”237  Rules are more 
distant from the norms they are based on and “do not depend on ongoing 
dialogue to gain dimension or content . . . even by someone who shares 
no sense of community with his fellows.”238 
The development at YouTube and Facebook from standards to rules 
for content moderation reflects these trade-offs.  A simple standard 
against something like gratuitous violence is able to reach a more tai-
lored and precise measure of justice that reflects the norms of the com-
munity, but it is vague, capricious, fact dependent, and costly to enforce. 
This can be seen at YouTube, which in mid-2006 employed just sixty 
workers to review all video that had been flagged by users for all rea-
sons.239  For violations of terms of service, one team of ten, deemed the 
Safety, Quality, and User Advocacy Department, or SQUAD, worked in 
shifts “around the clock” to keep YouTube from “becoming a shock 
site.”240  That team was given a one-page bullet-point list of standards 
that instructed on removal of things like animal abuse, videos showing 
blood, visible nudity, and pornography.241  A few months later, in the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 232 KELMAN, supra note 231, at 40 (emphasis omitted). 
 233 Id. at 41. 
 234 Id. at 40. 
 235 See id. at 40–47. 
 236 See Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 
107–11 (1997). 
 237 KELMAN, supra note 231, at 61. 
 238 Id. at 62. 
 239 Buni & Chemaly, supra note 12. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Id. 
  
2018] THE NEW GOVERNORS 1633 
fall of 2006, the YouTube list turned into a six-page booklet drafted with 
input from the SQUAD, Wong, and other YouTube lawyers and policy 
executives.242  Five years later, in 2011, the volume of uploaded video 
to YouTube had more than doubled in size, making delicate, precise 
decisions less feasible.243  In addition, the content-moderation team had 
expanded and been outsourced.  Accordingly, the more individually tai-
lored standards against gratuitous violence had slowly been replaced by 
precise rules, which were easier and less costly to enforce.  Moderators 
were given a booklet with internal rules for content moderation.  This 
booklet was regularly annotated and republished with changes to mod-
eration policies and rules.244  Many of these new rules were drafted as 
“exceptions” to rules.  Eventually, a more detailed iterative list of rules 
and their exceptions largely replaced the standards-based approach of 
earlier years. 
Similar to the experience at YouTube, Facebook eventually aban-
doned the standards-based approach as the volume of user-generated 
content increased, the user base diversified, and the content moderators 
globalized.  Dave Willner was at the helm of this transition.  Though 
Facebook had been open globally for years, Willner described much of 
the user base during his early days there as still relatively homogenous — 
“mostly American college students” — but that was rapidly changing as 
mobile technology improved and international access to the site grew.245  
Continuing to do content moderation from a single list of banned con-
tent seemed untenable and unwieldy.  Instead, Willner set about chang-
ing the entire approach: 
In the early drafts we had a lot of policies that were like: “Take down all 
the bad things.  Take down things that are mean, or racist, or bullying.”  
Those are all important concepts, but they’re value judgments.  You have 
to be more granular and less abstract than that.  Because if you say to forty 
college students [content moderators], “delete all racist speech,” they are not 
going to agree with each other about what’s racist.246 
Eliminating standards that evoked nonobservable values, feelings, 
or other subjective reactions was central to Willner’s new rulebook for 
moderation.  Instead, he focused on the implicit logic of the existing page 
of internal guidelines and his experience and extrapolated from them to 
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create objective rules.247  The first draft of these “all-encompassing” 
rules was written largely by Willner in 2009 and contained roughly 
15,000 words.248  The end goal was consistency and uniformity: to get 
the same judgment on a piece of content, regardless of who was moder-
ating it.249 
Exactly “who” was moderating the content changed significantly in 
January 2009, when Facebook opened its office in Dublin and first 
started outsourcing its content moderation through consulting groups.  
Before then, most moderators worked in Palo Alto and were similar to 
Facebook’s main user base — “homogenous college students.”250  The 
shift to outsourced moderation continued when a new community oper-
ations team was set up in Hyderabad, India.251  Around the same time, 
Hoffman joined Facebook’s team as Global Policy Manager with the 
goal of formalizing and consolidating the rules Willner had started to 
draft, and ensuring that Facebook was transparent with users by pub-
lishing a set of public rules in the form of “Community Standards.”252 
Hoffman and Willner worked together to transform the early ad hoc 
abuse standards into operational internal rules for content moderators, 
a document that today is over eighty pages long.253  This movement 
from standards to rules was “ultimately a form of technical writing,” 
said Willner.254  “You cannot tell people to delete photos with ugly 
clothes in them.  You have to say ‘delete photos with orange hats in 
them.’”255  For Willner, some of the hardest parts of defining categories, 
elements, and distinctions came in moderating art and nudity.256  For 
Hoffman, it was more difficult to create rules around hate speech.  “We 
couldn’t make a policy that said ‘no use of the N-word at all,’” he re-
called, describing the difficulty in policing racial slurs.257  “That could 
be completely insensitive to the African American community in the 
United States.  But you also don’t want it used as hate speech.  So it’s 
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almost impossible to turn that into an objective decision because context 
matters so much.”258  The answer was to turn context into a set of ob-
jective rules.  In evaluating whether speech was likely to provoke vio-
lence, for example, Hoffman and his team developed a four-part test to 
assess credible threats: time, place, method, and target.259  If a post spec-
ified any three of these factors, the content would be removed, and if 
appropriate, authorities notified.260 
Content moderation at YouTube and Facebook developed from an 
early system of standards to an intricate system of rules due to (1) the 
rapid increase in both users and volume of content; (2) the globalization 
and diversity of the online community; and (3) the increased reliance on 
teams of human moderators with diverse backgrounds.  The next sec-
tion discusses enforcement of these rules. 
B.  How the Rules Are Enforced: Trained Human Decisionmaking 
Content moderation happens at many levels.  It can happen before 
content is actually published on the site, as with ex ante moderation, or 
after content is published, as with ex post moderation.  These methods 
can be either reactive, in which moderators passively assess content and 
update software only after others bring the content to their attention, or 
proactive, in which teams of moderators actively seek out published con-
tent for removal.  Additionally, these decisions can be automatically 
made by software or manually made by humans.261  The majority of 
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this section focuses on ex post reactive content moderation, specifically 
looking at the implementation of rules with respect to human deci-
sionmaking, pattern recognition, and professionalization of judgment. 
1.  Ex Ante Content Moderation. — When a user uploads a video to 
Facebook, a message appears: “Processing Videos: The video in your 
post is being processed.  We’ll send you a notification when it’s done 
and your post is ready to view.”262  Ex ante content moderation is the 
process that happens in this moment between “upload” and publica-
tion.263  The vast majority of this moderation is an automatic process 
run largely through algorithmic screening without the active use of hu-
man decisionmaking. 
An example of content that can be moderated by these methods is 
child pornography, which can reliably be identified upon upload 
through a picture-recognition algorithm called PhotoDNA.264  Under 
federal law, production, distribution, reception, and possession of an im-
age of child pornography is illegal, and as such, sites are obligated to 
remove it.265  A known universe of child pornography — around 720,000 
illegal images — exists online.266  By converting each of these images to 
grayscale, overlaying a grid, and assigning a numerical value to each 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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square, researchers were able to create a “hash,” or signature, that re-
mained even if the images were altered.267  As a result, platforms can 
determine whether an image contains child pornography in the micro-
seconds between upload and publication.268  Geoblocking is another 
form of automatic ex ante moderation.  Unlike PhotoDNA, which pre-
vents the publication of illegal content, geoblocking prevents both pub-
lication and viewing of certain content based on a user’s location.  As 
happened in the controversy over the Innocence of Muslims video, geo-
blocking usually comes at the request of a government notifying a plat-
form that a certain type of posted content violates its local laws.269 
Of course, algorithms do not decide for themselves which kind of 
content they should block from being posted.  Content screened auto-
matically is typically content that can reliably be identified by software 
and is illegal or otherwise prohibited on the platform.  This universe of 
content that is automatically moderated ex ante is regularly evaluated 
and updated through iterative software updates and machine learning.  
For example, in a similar fashion to PhotoDNA, potential copyright vi-
olations can be moderated proactively through software like Content 
ID.  Developed by YouTube, Content ID allows creators to give their 
content a “digital fingerprint” so it can be compared against other up-
loaded content.270  Copyright holders can also flag already-published 
copyright violations through notice and takedown.271  These two sys-
tems work together, with user-flagged copyrighted material eventually 
added to ContentID databases for future proactive review.272  This mix 
of proactive, manual moderation and informed, automatic ex ante mod-
eration is also evident in the control of spam.  All three platforms (and 
most internet companies, generally) struggle to control spam postings on 
their sites.  Today, spam is mostly blocked automatically from publica-
tion through software.  Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, however, all 
feature mechanisms for users to report spam manually.273  Ex ante 
screening software is iteratively updated to reflect these flagged spam 
sources. 
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2.  Ex Post Proactive Manual Content Moderation. — Recently, a 
form of content moderation that harkens to the earlier era of AOL chat 
rooms has reemerged: platforms proactively seeking out and removing 
published content.  Currently, this method is largely confined to the 
moderation of extremist and terrorist speech.  As of February 2016, ded-
icated teams at Facebook have proactively removed all posts or profiles 
with links to terrorist activity.274  Such efforts were doubled in the wake 
of terrorist attacks.275  This is an important new development affecting 
content moderation, which seeks to strike an ever-evolving balance be-
tween competing interests: ensuring national security and maintaining 
individual liberty and freedom of expression.  While a topic worthy of 
deep discussion, it is not the focus of this paper.276 
3.  Ex Post Reactive Manual Content Moderation. — With the ex-
ception of proactive moderation for terrorism described above, almost 
all user-generated content that is published is reviewed reactively, that 
is, through ex post flagging by other users and review by human content 
moderators against internal guidelines.  Flagging — alternatively called 
reporting — is the mechanism provided by platforms to allow users to 
express concerns about potentially offensive content.277  The adoption 
by social media platforms of a flagging system serves two main func-
tions: (1) it is a “practical” means of reviewing huge volumes of content, 
and (2) its reliance on users serves to legitimize the system when plat-
forms are questioned for censoring or banning content.278 
Facebook users flag over one million pieces of content worldwide 
every day.279  Content can be flagged for a variety of reasons, and the 
vast majority of items flagged do not violate the Community Standards 
of Facebook.  Instead content flags often reflect internal group conflicts 
or disagreements of opinion.280  To resolve the issue, Facebook created 
a new reporting “flow” — the industry term to describe the sequence of 
screens users experience as they make selections — that encourages us-
ers to resolve issues themselves rather than report them for review to 
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Facebook.281  Users reporting content first click a button to “Re-
port/Mark as Spam,” which then quickly guides users to describe their 
report in terms like “Hate Speech,” “Violence or Harmful Behavior,” or 
“I Don’t Like This Post.”282  Some types of reports, such as harassment 
or self-harm, guide users to the option of “social reporting” — a tool that 
“enables people to report problematic content not only to Facebook, but 
also directly to their friends to help resolve conflicts.”283  To enhance the 
response time of content moderation, the reporting flow also has the 
instrumental purpose of triaging flagged content for review.284  This 
makes it possible for Facebook to immediately prioritize certain content 
for review and, when necessary, notify authorities of emergency situa-
tions like suicide, imminent threats of violence, terrorism, or self-harm.  
Other content, like possible hate speech, nudity, pornography, or harass-
ment, can be queued into less urgent databases for general review.285 
After content has been flagged to a platform for review, the precise 
mechanics of the decisionmaking process become murky.  The “army” 
of content moderators and “[t]he details of moderation practices are rou-
tinely hidden from public view,” write Catherine Buni and Soraya  
Chemaly.286  “[S]ocial media companies do not publish details of their 
internal content moderation guidelines; no major platform has made 
such guidelines public.”287  These internal guidelines also change much 
more frequently than the public Terms of Service or Community Stand-
ards.  Focusing largely on Facebook, except where specified, the next 
section seeks to illuminate this process by integrating previously pub-
lished information together with interviews of content moderators and 
platform internal guidelines.  The system of people making the decisions 
will be examined first followed by a review of the internal guidelines 
that inform that decisionmaking process. 
(a)  Who Enforces the Rules? — When content is flagged or reported, 
it is sent to a server where it awaits review by a human content moder-
ator.288  At Facebook, there are three basic tiers of content moderators: 
“Tier 3” moderators, who do the majority of the day-to-day reviewing 
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of content; “Tier 2” moderators, who supervise Tier 3 moderators and 
review prioritized or escalated content; and “Tier 1” moderators, who are 
typically lawyers or policymakers based at company headquarters.289 
In the early days, recent college graduates based in the San Francisco 
Bay Area did much of the Tier 3 content moderation.290  Today, most plat-
forms, including Facebook, either directly employ content-moderation 
teams or outsource much of their content-moderation work to companies 
like oDesk (now Upwork), Sutherland, and Deloitte.291  In 2009, Facebook 
opened an office in Dublin, Ireland, that had twenty dedicated support 
and user-operations staff.292  In 2010, working with an outsourcing part-
ner, Facebook opened a new office in Hyderabad, India, for user  
support.293 
Today, Tier 3 moderators typically work in “call centers”294 in the 
Philippines, Ireland, Mexico, Turkey, India, or Eastern Europe.295  
Within Facebook, these workers are called “community support” or 
“user support teams.”296  When working, moderators will log on to com-
puters and access the server where flagged content is awaiting review.297  
Tier 3 moderators typically review material that has been flagged as a 
lower priority by the reporting flow.  At Facebook, for example, this 
includes, in part, reports of nudity or pornography, insults or attacks 
based on religion, ethnicity, or sexual orientation, inappropriate or an-
noying content, content that is humiliating, or content that advocates 
violence to a person or animal.298 
Tier 2 moderators are typically supervisors of Tier 3 moderators or 
specialized moderators with experience judging content.  They work 
both remotely (many live in the United States and supervise groups that 
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are internationally based) and locally at call centers.299  Tier 2 modera-
tors review content that has been prioritized, like imminent threats of 
violence, self-harm, terrorism, or suicide.  This content comes to Tier 2 
directly through the reporting flow or by being identified and escalated 
to Tier 2 by Tier 3 moderators.  Tier 2 moderators also review certain 
randomized samples of Tier 3 moderation decisions.  In order to ensure 
the accuracy of moderation, Facebook and other platforms have a cer-
tain amount of built-in redundancy: the same piece of content is often 
given to multiple Tier 3 workers.  If the judgment on the content varies, 
the content is reassessed by a Tier 2 moderator.300 
Tier 1 moderation is predominantly performed at the legal or policy 
headquarters of a platform.  At Facebook, for example, a Tier 3 worker 
could be based in Hyderabad, a Tier 2 supervisor could be based in 
Hyderabad, or remotely in a place like Dublin, but a Tier 1 contact 
would be based in Austin, Texas, or the San Francisco Bay Area.  “There 
were not many levels between the boots-on-ground moderator and 
Menlo Park,” stated one former Tier 2 supervisor who had worked at 
Facebook until 2012, speaking on the condition of anonymity.301  “If I 
had doubts on something, I’d just send it up the chain.”302 
Recently, issues of scaling this model have led platforms to try new 
approaches to who enforces the rules.  At YouTube, a new initiative was 
launched in late 2016 called the Heroes program, which deputizes users 
to actively participate in the content-moderation process in exchange for 
perks such as “access to exclusive workshops and sneak preview product 
launches.”303  Similarly, after a video of the murder of an elderly man in 
Cleveland stayed up for over an hour on Facebook, Zuckerberg an-
nounced the company would hire 3000 additional content moderators, 
increasing the size of the content-moderation team by two-thirds.304 
(b)  How Are the Rules Enforced? — As previously discussed, the 
external policy — or Community Standards — provided to the public is 
not the same as the internal rulebook used by moderators when trying 
to assess whether content violates a platform’s terms of service.  An 
analysis of the internal guidelines reveals a structure that in many ways 
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replicates the decisionmaking process present in modern jurisprudence.  
Content moderators act in a capacity very similar to that of a judge: 
moderators are trained to exercise professional judgment concerning the 
application of a platform’s internal rules and, in applying these rules, 
moderators are expected to use legal concepts like relevance, reason 
through example and analogy, and apply multifactor tests. 
(i)  Training. — Willner and Hoffman’s development of objective 
internal rules at Facebook was a project that became an essential ele-
ment in the shift to content-moderation outsourcing made in early 
2010.305  While Facebook’s Community Standards were applied glob-
ally, without differentiation along cultural or national boundaries,306 
content moderators, in contrast, came with their own cultural inclina-
tions and biases.  In order to ensure that the Community Standards were 
enforced uniformly, it was necessary to minimize content moderators’ 
application of their own cultural values and norms when reviewing con-
tent and instead impose Facebook’s.307  The key to all of this was 
providing intensive in-person training on applying the internal rules.  “It 
all comes down to training,” stated Sasha Rosse, who worked with  
Willner to train the first team in Hyderabad:   
I liked to say that our goal was [to have a training system and rules set] so 
I could go into the deepest of the Amazon, but if I had developed parameters 
that were clear enough I could teach someone that had no exposure to any-
thing outside of their village how to do this job.308 
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Training moderators to overcome cultural biases or emotional reac-
tions in the application of rules to facts can be analogized to training 
lawyers or judges.  In the law, training lawyers and judges through law 
school and practice bestows a “specialized form of cognitive percep-
tion — what Karl Llewellyn called ‘situation sense’ — that reliably fo-
cuses their attention on the features of a case pertinent to its valid reso-
lution.”309  Professor Dan Kahan calls this “professional judgment,” but 
it might also be called “pattern recognition” after Professor Howard 
Margolis’s study of expert and lay assessments of risk,310 or even likened 
to the rapid, instinctual categorization used by chicken sexers, expert 
workers whose entire job is to determine the sex of baby chickens a day 
or two after the chickens hatch.311  Regardless of the label, training con-
tent moderators involves a repetitive process to “override” cultural or 
emotional reactions and replace them with rational “valid” resolutions.312 
Recent studies show that professionalized judgment can thwart cog-
nitive biases, in addition to increasing attention to relevant information 
and reliable application of rules.313  In a series of experiments, Kahan 
asked judges, lawyers, and law students with various political inclina-
tions to assess legal problems that were “designed to trigger unconscious 
political bias in members of the general public.”314  Despite the presence 
of irrelevant but polarizing facts, judges, and to a lesser degree, lawyers, 
were largely in agreement in deciding legal cases presented to them in 
the study.315  In contrast, law students and members of the general pub-
lic reliably made decisions in keeping with their personal political views 
when presented with politically polarizing information.316  Replication 
of the study expanded these findings beyond mere political ideologies to 
more general “cultural cognition,” that is, the “unconscious influence of 
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individuals’ group commitments on their perceptions of legally conse-
quential facts.”317 
The experiments by Kahan and his co-authors demonstrate empiri-
cally what Facebook learned through experience: people can be trained 
in domain-specific areas to overcome their cultural biases and to apply 
rules neutrally.  Just as this truth is an essential part of the legal system, 
it is an essential part of Facebook’s moderation system. 
(ii)  Similarities to American Law and Legal Reasoning. — Before 
applying law to facts, a judge must first determine which facts are rele-
vant.  Procedural rules like the Federal Rules of Evidence acknowledge 
that the inclusion of certain information may unfairly exploit deci-
sionmakers’ biases and emotions and, thus, provide guidance on how to 
exclude information from review.318  At Facebook, the internal rules 
used by content moderators, or “Abuse Standards,” similarly contain ex-
tensive guidance on what “relevant” content a moderator should review 
in assessing a report.319 
Once a moderator has followed the procedural rules to narrow the 
relevant content to be reviewed, the actual Abuse Standards — or 
rules — must be applied.  These start with a list of per se bans on con-
tent.320  In Abuse Standards 6.2, these per se bans on content are lists of 
rules split into nine somewhat overlapping categories.321  But as is typ-
ical of a rules-based approach, these lists contain as many exceptions as 
they do rules.  In “Graphic Content,” listed violations include any 
“[p]oaching of animals” as well as “[p]hotos and digital images showing 
internal organs, bone, muscle, tendons, etc.,” while “[c]rushed heads, 
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 317 Kahan et al., supra note 313, at 851. 
 318 See Kahan et al., supra note 309, at 365.  
 319 ODESK, ABUSE STANDARDS 6.1, https://www.scribd.com/doc/81863464/oDeskStandards 
[https://perma.cc/P6ZV-V9ZA] [hereinafter AS 6.1]; ODESK, ABUSE STANDARDS 6.2, 
https://www.scribd.com/doc/81877124/Abuse-Standards-6-2-Operation-Manual [https://perma.cc/ 
2JQF-AWMY] [hereinafter AS 6.2].  These are copies of documents that were leaked from a content 
moderator working at oDesk (now Upwork) doing content moderation for Facebook.  They are not 
the actual rules of Facebook, but they are oDesk’s approximation of Facebook’s rules.  Charles 
Arthur, Facebook’s Nudity and Violence Guidelines Are Laid Bare, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 21, 2012, 
4:36 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/feb/21/facebook-nudity-violence-censorship- 
guidelines [https://perma.cc/9LNL-L4C6].  For a more current but very similar version of these 
policies as expressed through content-moderator training documents, see Nick Hopkins, Revealed: 
Facebook’s Internal Rulebook on Sex, Terrorism and Violence, THE GUARDIAN (May 21, 2017, 
1:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/may/21/revealed-facebook-internal-rulebook-
sex-terrorism-violence [https://perma.cc/U7DY-5VHE]. 
 320 AS 6.1, supra note 319; AS 6.2, supra note 319. 
 321 Those categories are “Sex and Nudity,” “Illegal Drug Use,” “Theft Vandalism and Fraud,” 
“Hate Content,” “Graphic Content,” “IP Blocks and International Compliance,” “Self Harm,” “Bul-
lying and Harassment,” and “Credible Threats.”  AS 6.2, supra note 319, at 4.  Among the twelve 
items under “Sex and Nudity,” for example, are “[a]ny OBVIOUS sexual activity, even if naked parts 
are hidden from view by hands, clothes or other objects.  Cartoons/art included.  Foreplay allowed 
([k]issing, groping, etc.) even for same-sex individuals” and “[p]eople ‘using the bathroom.’”  Id. 
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limbs, etc. are ok as long as no insides are showing.”322  Likewise, “mere 
depiction” of some types of content — “hate symbols” like swastikas, or 
depictions of Hitler or Bin Laden — are automatic violations, “unless 
the caption (or other relevant content) suggests that the user is not pro-
moting, encouraging or glorifying the [symbol].”323 
Some more complicated types of speech borrow from American ju-
risprudence for the structure of their rules.  Under “Hate Content,” a 
chart provides examples of “Protected Categories” and counsels moder-
ators to mark “content that degrades individuals based on the . . . pro-
tected categories” as a violation.324  A second chart on the page demon-
strates how the identification of the type of person — ordinary persons, 
public figures, law enforcement officers, and heads of state — as well as 
their membership in a protected group will factor into the permissibility 
of the content.325  All credible threats are to be escalated regardless of 
the “type of person.”326  These examples demonstrate the influence of 
American jurisprudence on the development of these rules.  Reference 
to “Protected Categories” is similar to the protected classes of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.327  The distinction between public and private fig-
ures is reminiscent of First Amendment, defamation, and invasion of 
privacy law.328  The emphasis on credibility of threats harkens to the 
balance between free speech and criminal law.329 
Beyond borrowing from the law substantively, the Abuse Standards 
borrow from the way the law is applied, providing examples and anal-
ogies to help moderators apply the rules.  Analogical legal reasoning, the 
method whereby judges reach decisions by reasoning through analogy 
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 322 Id.  
 323 Id. at 8. 
 324 Id. at 5 (including race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sex, gender identity, sexual orien-
tation, disability, and serious disease as protected categories). 
 325 Id.  An empty threat against a public figure like Paul McCartney is permissible, but an empty 
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about a law enforcement officer — empty threat, credible threat, negative reference, cyberbullying, 
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 326 “For safety and legal reasons, we consider threats credible if they:  
1.  Target heads of state or specific law enforcement officers . . . [;] 
2.  Contain 3/4 details: time, place, method, specific target (not impossible to carry out)[;] 
3.  Target people with a history of assassination attempt/s[;]  
4.  Include non-governmental bounties (promising earthly and heavenly rewards for a 
target’s death)[.]”   
Id. at 7. 
 327 Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 201–202, 703, 78 Stat. 241, 243–44, 255–57 (outlawing discrimination 
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).  
 328 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) (refusing to extend the N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254 (1964), standard for public officials’ defamation claims to private individuals).  
 329 See, e.g., Brett A. Sokolow et al., The Intersection of Free Speech and Harassment Rules, 38 
HUM. RTS. 19, 19 (2011). 
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between cases, is a foundation of legal theory.330  Though the use of exam-
ple and analogy plays a central role throughout the Abuse Standards,331 
the combination of legal rule and example in content moderation seems 
to contain elements of both rule-based legal reasoning and analogical 
legal reasoning.  For example, after stating the rules for assessing credi-
bility, the Abuse Standards give a series of examples of instances that 
establish credible or noncredible threats.332  “I’m going to stab (method) 
Lisa H. (target) at the frat party (place),” states Abuse Standards 6.2, 
demonstrating a type of credible threat that should be escalated.333  “I’m 
going to blow up the planet on new year’s eve this year” is given as an 
example of a noncredible threat.334  Thus, content moderators are not 
expected to reason directly from prior content decisions as in common 
law — but the public policies, internal rules, examples, and analogies 
they are given in their rulebook are informed by past assessments. 
In many ways, platforms’ evolution from “gut check” standards to 
more specific rules tracks the evolution of the Supreme Court’s doctrine 
defining obscenity.  In Jacobellis v. Ohio,335 Justice Stewart wrote that 
he could not “intelligibly” define what qualified something as obscene, 
but famously remarked, “I know it when I see it.”336  Both Charlotte 
Willner, at Facebook, and Nicole Wong, at Google, described a similar 
intuitive ethos for removing material in the early days of the platforms’ 
content-moderation policies.337  Eventually, Facebook’s and YouTube’s 
moderation standards moved from these standards to rules.  Likewise, 
over a series of decisions, the Court attempted to make the criteria for 
obscenity more specific — in Miller v. California,338 the Court issued a 
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 330 See LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REASON: THE USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL ARGU-
MENT (2005); Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501 (1948).  
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TIFYING LEGAL REASONING 64–103 (2008); Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, On Analogical Rea-
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 331 This is especially true in the case of introducing new rules or policies to moderators.  For 
example, Abuse Standards 6.2 introduces a “fresh policy” on sexually explicit language and sexual 
solicitation, and lists thirteen examples of content that should be removed or kept up under the 
policy.  AS 6.2, supra note 319, at 6.  In Abuse Standards 6.1, an entire page is devoted to samples 
of pictures that fall in or out of the various bans on sex and nudity, cartoon bestiality, graphic 
violence, animal abuse, or Photoshopped images.  AS 6.1, supra note 319, at 4. 
 332 AS 6.2, supra note 319. 
 333 Id. at 7. 
 334 Id. 
 335 378 U.S. 184 (1964). 
 336 Id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 337 Telephone Interview with Dave Willner & Charlotte Willner, supra note 147; Telephone  
Interview with Nicole Wong, supra note 130. 
 338 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
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three-part test to evaluate whether state statutes designed to regulate 
obscene materials were sufficiently limited.339  None of the tests created 
by the Court, however, comes close to the specificity of the facts and 
exceptions used by platforms today. 
To summarize, knowledge about the training of content moderators 
and Abuse Standards 6.1 and 6.2 tells us much about how the rules are 
enforced in content-moderation decisions.  Content moderators act in a 
capacity very similar to that of judges: (1) like judges, moderators are 
trained to exercise professional judgment concerning the application of 
a platform’s internal rules; and (2) in applying these rules, moderators 
are expected to use legal concepts like relevancy, reason through exam-
ple and analogy, and apply multifactor tests. 
4.  Decisions, Escalations, and Appeals. — At Facebook, Tier 3 mod-
erators have three decisionmaking options regarding content: they can 
“confirm” that the content violates the Community Standards and re-
move it, “unconfirm” that the content violates Community Standards 
and leave it up, or escalate review of the content to a Tier 2 moderator 
or supervisor.340  The Abuse Standards describe certain types of content 
requiring mandatory escalations, such as: child nudity or pornography, 
bestiality, credible threats, self-harm, poaching of endangered animals, 
Holocaust denial, all attacks on Atatürk, maps of Kurdistan, and burn-
ing of Turkish Flags.341  If a moderator has decided to ban content, a 
Facebook user’s content is taken down, and she is automatically signed 
off of Facebook.  When the user next attempts to sign in, she will be 
given the following message: “We removed the post below because it 
doesn’t follow the Facebook Community Standards.”342  When she 
clicks “Continue,” the user is told: “Please Review the Community 
Standards: We created the Facebook Community Standards to help 
make Facebook a safe place for people to connect with the world around 
them.  Please read the Facebook Community Standards to learn what 
kinds of posts are allowed on Facebook.”343  The user then clicks “Okay” 
and is allowed to log back in.  At Facebook, users who repeatedly have 
content removed face a gradual intensification of punishment: two re-
moved posts in a certain amount of time, for example, might mean your 
account is suspended for twenty-four hours.  Further violations of com-
munity standards can result in total bans.  At YouTube, moderators had 
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 339 Id. at 24.  
 340 AS 6.1, supra note 319; AS 6.2, supra note 319. 
 341 AS 6.2, supra note 319, at 4. 
 342 Screenshot of Facebook Removal Notice, ME.ME (June 13, 2017, 5:38 AM), 
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a slightly different set of options for each piece of content: “Approve” let 
a video remain; “Racy” gave the video an 18+ year-old rating; “Reject” 
allowed a video to be removed without penalizing the poster; and finally, 
“Strike” would remove the video and issue a penalty to the poster’s  
account.344 
The ability of an individual user to appeal a decision on content 
takedown, account suspension, or account deletion varies widely be-
tween the three major platforms.  Facebook allows an appeal of the 
removal of only a profile or page — not individual posts or content.345  
To initiate an appeal process, a user’s account must have been sus-
pended.346  Appeals are reviewed by the Community Operations teams 
on a rolling basis and sent to special reviewers.347  In contrast, at 
YouTube, account suspensions, “strikes” on an account, and content re-
moval are all appealable.348  Video strikes can be appealed only once, 
and if a decision to strike is upheld, there is a sixty-day moratorium on 
the appeal of any additional strikes.349  An appeal also lies if an account 
is terminated for repeated violations.350  At Twitter, any form of action 
related to the Twitter Rules can be appealed.351  Users follow instruc-
tions on the app itself or provided in an email sent to notify users that 
content has been taken down.352  Twitter also includes an intermediary 
level of removal called a “media filter” on content that might be sensi-
tive.353  Rather than totally remove the content, the platform requires 
users to click through a warning in order to see the content.354  Appeals 
are handled by support teams that, when possible, will use specialized 
team members to review culturally specific content.355 
C.  System Revision and the Pluralistic System of Influence 
Facebook’s Abuse Standards do more than shed light on substantive 
rules on speech or the mechanisms behind its decisionmaking.  They 
also demonstrate that the internal rules of content moderation are iter-
atively revised on an ongoing basis, and much more frequently than the 
external public-facing policy.  This can be seen on the first page of Abuse 
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 344 Buni & Chemaly, supra note 12. 
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 347 Telephone Interview with J.L., supra note 289.  
 348 How to Appeal, supra note 345. 
 349 Id. 
 350 Id. 
 351 Id. 
 352 Id. 
 353 Id. 
 354 Id. 
 355 Id. 
  
2018] THE NEW GOVERNORS 1649 
Standards 6.1, titled “Major changes since A[buse] S[tandards] 6.0,” 
which contains a bulleted list of amendments and alterations to the pre-
vious set of rules.356  The list is divided into groupings of roughly related 
policy changes.357  “Added sexual language and solicitation policy,” 
states the first bullet.358  Halfway down the page after “Sex & Nudity 
issues clarified” is a bulleted section beginning “Graphic violence poli-
cies updated as follows.”359  In Abuse Standards 6.2, there are fewer 
updates, summarized broadly under one bullet point, “Policy Changes”: 
Graphic Content with respect to animal insides 
Threshold and considerations for credible threats 
Caricatures of protected categories 
Depicting bodily fluids 
Screenshots or other content revealing personal information 
PKK versus Kurdistan flags 
Updated policy on photo-shopped images360 
The differences between these two versions demonstrate that inter-
nal policies and the rules that reflect them are constantly being updated.  
This is because Facebook is attempting, in large part, to rapidly reflect 
the norms and expectations of its users. 
But how are platforms made aware of these “dramatically fast”361 
changing global norms such that they are able to alter the rules?  This 
section discusses four major ways platforms’ content-moderation poli-
cies are subject to outside influence: (1) government request, (2) media 
coverage, (3) third-party civil society groups, and (4) individual users’ 
use of the moderation process. 
This multi-input content-moderation system is a type of pluralistic 
system.362  Under the ideal theory, a pluralistic system consists of many 
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 356 AS 6.1, supra note 319, at 2. 
 357 Id. 
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diverse external factions of equal strength competing to influence a neu-
tral government.363  In a perfect world, the competition between these 
minority factional interests serves to maintain equilibrium and repre-
sentation of ideas in a democratic society.364  But in practice, pluralism 
can be far from ideal.365  This section discusses these interests and their 
potential democratic conflicts in the context of outside influence on plat-
forms’ content-moderation policies. 
1.  Government Requests.366 — Lessig describes the architecture of 
the internet — or constitution — as built by an “invisible hand, pushed 
by government and by commerce.”367  Lessig does not describe these 
two forces as separate, but rather tandem in their effect.  Thus far, this 
Article has principally focused on the commercial side of this dynamism, 
but platform architecture has also been informed by and subject to gov-
ernment interference.  This interference can be through the more direct 
need to comply with local laws and jurisdictions, or by the more subtle 
influences of government lobbying and requests. 
The previous examples of the Thai King, Atatürk, and Innocence of 
Muslims368 illustrate how platforms have either conformed their poli-
cies, modified their policies, or rejected policy changes following gov-
ernment request.  At YouTube, material would be removed within a 
country only if it violated the laws of that country — whether or not it 
was a violation was determined by YouTube’s own lawyers.369  If con-
tent was found to be in violation of a country’s laws, a new policy would 
be issued and geoblocks put in place to prevent access to that content 
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 363 HELD, supra note 362, at 57–64. 
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within that country.370  Similar agreements were reached regarding de-
pictions of Atatürk in Turkey.371  At Facebook, however, content is not 
geoblocked but removed globally if international compliance requires.372  
Examples of this include support of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(PKK) or any content supporting Abdullah Ocalan.373  Other types of 
content with specific geographic sensitivities, like Holocaust denial fo-
cusing on hate speech, attacks on Atatürk, maps of Kurdistan, and burn-
ing of Turkish flags, are required to be escalated.374 
Twitter maintains a policy that it will take down posts only on re-
quest and only if they violate a country’s laws.375  This policy has occa-
sionally been at odds with Twitter’s more unofficial tactic of vigorously 
and litigiously protecting free speech.376  Compromises have been 
reached, however, without sacrificing one for the other: in 2012, when 
India demanded Twitter remove a number of accounts that were fueling 
religious dissent, the company removed roughly half of the problematic 
accounts, but did so on the grounds that they violated Twitter’s own 
policies for impersonation.377  In other contexts, such as the requests for 
takedown in Egypt and Turkey, particularly during periods of revolu-
tion, Twitter has refused to capitulate to any government requests, and 
governments have consequently blocked the platform.378 
Recently, however, platforms have been criticized for increasingly ac-
quiescing to government requests, especially in the distribution of user 
information to police.379  Platforms have also begun cooperating more 
proactively in response to the increased use of social media by the  
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to recruit members and encourage 
terrorism.  Over the last few years, all three sites have agreed to general 
requests from the United States and the United Nations to remove con-
tent related to ISIS or terrorism.380  As discussed briefly in section III.B, 
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Facebook now maintains a team that is focused on terrorism-related 
content and helps promote “counter speech” against such groups.381  The 
team actively polices terrorist pages and friend networks on the site.  No 
posts from known terrorists are allowed on the site, even if the posts 
have nothing to do with terrorism.  “If it’s the leader of Boko Haram 
and he wants to post pictures of his two-year-old and some kittens, that 
would not be allowed,” said Monika Bickert, Facebook’s head of global 
policy management.382  As Facebook has become more adept at and 
committed to removing such terrorism-related content, that content has 
moved to less restrictive platforms like Twitter.  In just a four-month pe-
riod in 2014, ISIS supporters used an estimated 46,000 Twitter accounts, 
though not all were active simultaneously.383  Just before the dissemina-
tion of pictures of American journalist James Foley’s beheading, the plat-
form in 2015 began taking a different approach.384  In early 2016, Twitter 
reported that it had suspended 125,000 accounts related to ISIS.385 
2.  Media Coverage. — The media do not have a major role in chang-
ing platform policy per se, but when media coverage is coupled with 
either (1) the collective action of users or (2) a public figure’s involve-
ment, platforms have historically been responsive. 
An early high-profile example of media catalyzing collective action 
occurred around a clash between Facebook’s nudity policy and breast-
feeding photos posted by users.  As early as 2008, Facebook received 
criticism for removing posts that depicted a woman breastfeeding.386  
The specifics of what triggered removal changed over time.387  The 
changes came, in part, after a campaign in the media and in pages on 
Facebook itself staged partly by women who had their content re-
moved.388  Similar policy changes occurred after public outcry over  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-internet-extremism-video-exclusive/exclusive-google-facebook-
quietly-move-toward-automatic-blocking-of-extremist-videos-idUSKCN0ZB00M [https://perma. 
cc/G3AT-J5K6]. 
 381 Andrews & Seetharaman, supra note 274. 
 382 Telephone Interview with Monika Bickert & Peter Stern, supra note 279. 
 383 Julia Greenberg, Why Facebook and Twitter Can’t Just Wipe Out ISIS Online, WIRED (Nov. 
21, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/11/facebook-and-twitter-face-tough-choices-as-
isis-exploits-social-media/ [https://perma.cc/QFU9-2N5V]. 
 384 J.M. Berger, The Evolution of Terrorist Propaganda: The Paris Attack and Social Media, 
BROOKINGS INST.: TESTIMONY (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/research/ 
testimony/2015/01/27-terrorist-propaganda-social-media-berger [https://perma.cc/28QK-HUJU]. 
 385 Andrews & Seetharaman, supra note 274. 
 386 Mark Sweney, Mums Furious as Facebook Removes Breastfeeding Photos, THE GUARDIAN 
(Dec. 30, 2008, 8:17 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2008/dec/30/facebook-breastfeeding-
ban [https://perma.cc/Y3V4-X4EG]. 
 387 See Soraya Chemaly, #FreeTheNipple: Facebook Changes Breastfeeding Mothers Photo Pol-
icy, HUFFINGTON POST (June 9, 2014, 6:48 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/soraya- 
chemaly/freethenipple-facebook-changes_b_5473467.html [https://perma.cc/8TPP-JEGT]. 
 388 Id. 
  
2018] THE NEW GOVERNORS 1653 
Facebook’s “real name” policy,389 removal of a gay kiss,390 censoring of 
an 1886 painting that depicted a nude woman,391 posting of a beheading 
video,392 and takedown of photos depicting doll nipples.393 
The vulnerability of platforms to public collective action via the me-
dia is an important statement on platforms’ democratic legitimacy.394  
The media can serve to lend “civility” to individual speech, and render 
it more capable of effecting change.395  Though, of course, Facebook, 
Twitter, and YouTube are not democratic institutions, they arise out of 
a democratic culture.  Thus, users’ sense that these platforms respond 
to collective publicized complaints can impact their trust and use of the 
company.  In a recent survey of Americans who received some of their 
news from social media, eighty-seven percent used Facebook and trusted 
the platform more than YouTube and Twitter.396  These numbers held 
even following reports that Facebook used politically biased algorithms 
to post news in its “Trending Topics.”397  While it is impossible to attrib-
ute Facebook’s high user base and trust entirely to its responsiveness to 
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media outcry, the platform’s unique history of altering its policies in re-
sponse to such complaints has likely fostered its user base. 
Though ideally democratic, the media can work within this pluralist 
system to disproportionately favor people with power398 over the indi-
vidual users.  A series of recent events demonstrate this concept.  In 
September 2016, a well-known Norwegian author, Tom Egeland, posted 
a famous and historical picture on his Facebook page.  The photo of a 
nine-year-old Vietnamese girl running naked following a napalm attack 
(“Napalm Girl”) was a graphic but important piece of photo journalism 
from the Vietnam War.399  It also violated the terms of service for  
Facebook.400  The photo was removed, and Egeland’s account was sus-
pended.401  In reporting on the takedown, Espen Egil Hansen, the edi-
tor-in-chief and CEO of Aftenposten, a Norwegian newspaper, also had 
the picture removed.402  Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg also 
posted the image and had it removed.403  In response, Hansen published 
a “letter” to Zuckerberg on Aftenposten’s front page.  The letter called 
for Facebook to create a better system to prevent censorship.404  Hours 
later, COO Sheryl Sandberg stated that the company had made a mis-
take and promised the rules would be rewritten to allow the photo.405  
The responsiveness of Facebook would have been more admirable if this 
had been the first instance of the Napalm Girl photo ever being censored 
on the site.  But instead, it was likely only one of thousands of times the 
photo had been removed.406  To the best of my knowledge, however, all 
prior instances had failed to happen to a famous author, political world 
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leader, or the editor-in-chief of a newspaper — and thus, the content 
had never been reinstated. 
Sometimes the speech of powerful people is not just restored upon 
removal; it is kept up despite breaking the platform policies.  In late 
October, a source at Facebook revealed that Zuckerberg held a Town 
Hall meeting with employees to discuss why many of then-candidate 
Donald Trump’s more controversial statements had not been removed 
from the site even though they violated the hate speech policies of the 
company.407  “In the weeks ahead, we’re going to begin allowing more 
items that people find newsworthy, significant, or important to the pub-
lic interest — even if they might otherwise violate our standards,” senior 
members of Facebook’s policy team wrote in a public post.408  Despite 
that, many employees continued to protest that Facebook was unequally 
and unfairly applying its terms of service and content-moderation rules. 
3.  Third-Party Influences. — For a number of years, platforms have 
worked with outside groups to discuss how best to construct content-
moderation policies.  One of the first such meetings occurred in 2012, 
when Stanford Law School invited many of these platforms to be part 
of a discussion about online hate speech.409  In April of that year, roughly 
two dozen attendees — including ask.fm, Facebook, Google, Microsoft, 
Quizlet, Soundcloud, Twitter, Whisper, Yahoo, and YouTube410 — met 
to discuss the “challenge of enforcing . . . community guidelines for free 
speech” between platforms that have “very different ideas about what’s 
best for the Web.”411  The best practices that came out of these meetings 
were issued at the conclusion of months of meetings of the Working 
Group on Cyberhate and were published on the Anti-Defamation 
League’s (ADL) website in a new page called “Best Practices for Re-
sponding to Cyberhate” in September 2014.412  The page “urge[d] mem-
bers of the Internet Community, including providers, civil society, the 
legal community and academia, to express their support for this effort 
and to publicize their own independent efforts to counter cyberhate.”413 
Civil society and third-party groups had and continue to have an 
impact on the policies and practices of major social media platforms.  
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Sit-downs and conversations sponsored by groups like ADL have 
pushed the creation of industry best practices.  Influence also occurs on 
a smaller scale.  “We have a relationship with them where if we flag 
something for them, they tend to know that it’s serious, that they should 
look sooner rather than later,” stated a member of one third-party anti-
hate speech group speaking anonymously.414  But such a relationship 
isn’t exclusive to just organized advocates or established groups.  Re-
porter and feminist Soraya Chemaly recounts directly emailing Sandberg 
in 2012 regarding graphic Facebook pages about rape and battery of 
women.  “She responded immediately,” says Chemaly, “and put us in 
touch with the head of global policy.”415  Facebook actively encourages 
this type of engagement with civil society groups, government officials, 
and reporters.  “If there’s something that the media or a government 
minister or another group sees that they’ve reported and we haven’t 
taken it down, we want to hear about it,” said Bickert.416  “We’ve been 
very proactive in engaging with civil society groups all over the world so 
that we can get a better understanding of the issues affecting them.”417 
In terms of impacting policy, the Working Group on Cyberhate, 
which was formed in 2012 by the Inter-Parliamentary Coalition for 
Combating Anti-Semitism and the group of industry leaders and stake-
holders at Stanford,418 continues to exert influence on the platforms.  
The group regularly meets to try to tailor platform guidelines to strike 
the correct balance between freedom of expression and user safety.419  
Other groups, like the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), have a 
slightly less amicable working relationship with these platforms and ex-
ist as more like watchdogs than policy collaborators.  Launched in 2012, 
EFF’s site, onlinecensorship.org, works to document when user content 
is blocked or deleted by providing an online tool where users can report 
such incidents.420  “Onlinecensorship.org seeks to encourage companies 
to operate with greater transparency and accountability toward their 
users as they make decisions that regulate speech,” states the site’s 
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About Page.421  “By collecting these reports, we’re . . . looking . . . to 
build an understanding of how the removal of content affects users’ 
lives.  Often . . . the people that are censored are also those that are least 
likely to be heard.  Our aim is to amplify those voices and help them to 
advocate for change.”422  The recent, largely opaque, cooperation be-
tween content platforms and government to moderate speech related to 
terrorism is also an issue of concern for EFF, which has urged such 
groups “not to ‘become agents of the government.’”423  EFF’s director 
of International Freedom of Expression, Jillian York, said, “I think we 
have to ask if that’s the appropriate response in a democracy.”424  “While 
it’s true that companies legally can restrict speech as they see fit, it 
doesn’t mean that it’s good for society to have the companies that host 
most of our everyday speech taking on that kind of power.”425 
4.  Change Through Process. — Beyond outside influences, much of 
the change in moderation policy and guidelines comes simply from the 
process of moderation.  As new situations arise during moderation, plat-
forms will both tweak current policy as well as develop new rules.  “Peo-
ple will do everything on the internet,” said Jud Hoffman.426  “Every 
day you will encounter something new. . . . The difficulty was making 
sure we were [reacting] fast enough to address the immediate situations 
that were causing us to consider [changing our approach], but also being 
thoughtful enough that we weren’t flip-flopping on that particular issue 
every week.”427  Once the team had come to a conclusion about the 
“trade-offs” for a new policy, the additions would be disseminated in the 
new guidelines, which would then be distributed as updates to modera-
tors.428  Many of these judgments continue to be difficult to make, such 
as, for example, Nicole Wong’s story of removal from YouTube of the 
beating of an Egyptian dissident.  The video was restored once its po-
litical significance was understood.  “You might see an image that at 
first blush appears disturbing, yet in many cases it is precisely that sort 
of power image that can raise consciousness and move people to take 
action and, therefore, we want to consider very, very seriously the pos-
sibility of leaving it up,” said Peter Stern, head of the Policy Risk Team 
at Facebook.429  “We want people to feel safe on Facebook, but that 
doesn’t always mean they’re going to feel comfortable, because they may 
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be exposed to images that are provocative or even disturbing.  We want 
to leave room for that role to be played as well.”430 
In recent years, Facebook’s approach to altering its policy has been 
less passive than simply waiting for new types of content to filter 
through the system.  “We’re trying to look beyond individual incidents 
where we get criticism, to take a broader view of the fabric of our poli-
cies, and make sure that we have mitigated risks arising from our poli-
cies as much as we can,” said Stern.431  “This means looking at 
trends . . . at what people within the company are saying . . . be it re-
viewers or people who are dealing with government officials in other 
countries.  We regularly take this information and process it and con-
sider alterations in the policy.”432 
D.  Within Categories of the First Amendment 
In light of this new information about how platforms work, how 
would the First Amendment categorize online content platforms: are 
they state actors under Marsh, broadcasters under Red Lion and Turner, 
or more like newspaper editors under Tornillo? 
Of these, only finding platforms to be state actors would confer a 
First Amendment obligation — a result that is both unlikely and nor-
matively undesirable.  In finding state action, the Court in Marsh was 
particularly concerned with who regulated the municipal powers, public 
services, and infrastructure of the company town — the streets, sewers, 
police, and postal service.433  Subsequent courts have concluded that 
these facts bear on whether “the private entity has exercised powers that 
are ‘traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.’”434  This Article 
has detailed how platforms have developed a similar infrastructure to 
regulate users’ speech through detailed rules, active and passive moder-
ation, trained human decisionmaking, reasoning by analogy, and input 
from internal and external sources.  Yet this similarity, while perhaps 
moving in a direction which might someday evoke Marsh, is not yet 
enough to turn online platforms into state actors under the state action 
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doctrine.435  In part, this is because while platforms have an incredible 
governing system to moderate content and perform a vast number of 
other services which might someday be considered “municipal,” they are 
far from “exclusive” in their control of these rights.436  As the presence 
of three major sites for posting this content demonstrates, Facebook, 
YouTube, and Twitter do not have sole control over speech generally, 
only speech on their sites.437 
The Court’s recent ruling in Packingham, however, could signal a 
shift that might change this calculus.  If the Court is concerned with 
questions of access in order to exercise constitutionally protected rights, 
these sites’ ability to remove speakers — and the lack of procedure or 
transparency in doing so — might be of central importance.  Still, find-
ing platforms to be state actors seems a long way off and would require 
a very expansive interpretation of Marsh’s current doctrine.  Even 
should the facts necessary to achieve this interpretation come to pass, 
the normative implications of such a result make it unlikely.  Interpret-
ing online platforms as state actors, and thereby obligating them to pre-
serve the First Amendment rights of their users, would not only explic-
itly conflict with the purposes of § 230, but would also likely create an 
internet nobody wants.  Platforms would no longer be able to remove 
obscene or violent content.  All but the very basest speech would be 
explicitly allowed and protected — making current problems of online 
hate speech, bullying, and terrorism, with which many activists and 
scholars are concerned, unimaginably worse.438  This alone might be all 
that is needed to keep platforms from being categorized as state actors. 
If these platforms are not state actors, the question of defining them 
under the First Amendment becomes more complicated.  Considering 
online content providers to be editors like those in Tornillo, for instance, 
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would grant them special First Amendment protection.  While plat-
forms’ omnipresent role seems to be moving them beyond the world of 
“editors,” Packingham’s new labeling of platforms as “forums” makes 
dismissing this categorization slightly more difficult.  In Tornillo, the 
Court held that a newspaper was “more than a passive receptacle or 
conduit for news, comment, and advertising.  The choice of material to 
go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size 
and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public of-
ficials — whether fair or unfair — constitute the exercise of editorial 
control and judgment.”439  Thus, in order not to “dampen[] the vigor 
and limit[] the variety of public debate,”440 the Court found the news-
paper in Tornillo to have rights equivalent to a speaker under the First 
Amendment.441  At first blush, this analogy seems appealing.  As seen 
above, like the Miami Herald, Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter are not 
“passive . . . conduit[s] for news, comment, and advertising.”  These 
platforms have intricate systems for controlling the content on their 
sites.  For the content that stays up — like a newspaper determining 
what space to allot certain issues — platforms also have intricate algo-
rithms to determine what material a user wants to see and what material 
should be minimized within a newsfeed, homepage, or stream.  But a 
central piece is missing in the comparison to an editorial desk: platforms 
do not actively solicit specific types of content, unlike how an editorial 
desk might solicit reporting or journalistic coverage.  Instead, users use 
the site to post or share content independently.  Additionally, platforms 
play no significant role — yet442 — in determining whether content is 
true or false or whether coverage is fair or unfair.  As Willner summa-
rized: “This works like a Toyota factory, not a newsroom.”443  Accord-
ingly, while platforms might increasingly be compared to editors as their 
presence continues to expand in online discourse, they are still far from 
constituting editors under Tornillo.444 
Perhaps the increasingly apt analogy is — even though the Court in 
Reno explicitly excluded it — to compare platforms to broadcasters, and 
then perhaps even to public utilities or common carriers.445  In Reno, 
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the Court explicitly differentiated the internet from broadcast media be-
cause the former lacks scarcity, invasiveness, and a history of govern-
ment regulation.446  Excepting the lack of historical regulation around 
the internet, much has changed online since 1998 in terms of internet 
scarcity and invasiveness.  In the years since Reno, the hold of certain 
platforms has arguably created scarcity — if not of speech generally, 
undoubtedly of certain mediums of speech that these platforms provide.  
Certainly too, the internet is now more invasive in everyday life than 
television is — in fact, today, the internet actively threatens to supplant 
television and broadcasting,447 and the rise in smartphones and portable 
electronic technology makes the internet and its platforms ubiquitous.  
Perhaps most convincingly, in the underlying Red Lion decision, the 
Court argued that “[w]ithout government control, the medium would be 
of little use because of the cacaphony [sic] of competing voices, none of 
which could be clearly and predictably heard.”448  The recent scourge of 
online fake news, scamming, and spam makes this seemingly anachro-
nistic concern newly relevant. 
As for public utilities or common carriers regulation, the argument 
has long been applied at the most basic level of the internet to answer 
concerns over possible politicization of internet service providers449 that 
act as content-neutral conduits for speech.  But this argument fails for 
platforms, because they are inherently not neutral — indeed the very 
definition of “content moderation” belies the idea of content neutrality.  
Nevertheless, the “essential” nature of these private services to a public 
right — and the prominence of a few platforms which hold an increasingly 
powerful market share — evinces concerns similar to those of the people 
who are arguing for regulation of telephone or broadband services. 
A few other analogies that implicate the First Amendment might also 
apply, but they all fail to match the scope and scale of the speech hap-
pening on online platforms.  Platforms’ use of rule sets to govern speech 
is reminiscent of “speech codes” used by universities to constrain the 
speech rights of the student body.  But private universities are not truly 
full-fledged forums — not in the way that California and New Jersey 
treat shopping malls,450 and not in the way that platforms have become 
forums for global public speech.451  Forums are incidental to the primary 
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role of the university, which is to act as an educational institution.452  
The same is true in examining the ability of homeowners’ associations 
or professional organizations to conscribe the speech of members or in-
dividuals.453  The special purposes of universities, professional organi-
zations, or homeowners’ associations — to confer knowledge, protect a 
professional identity, or create a distinct visual community — are dis-
tinct from the motives of online speech platforms.  Moreover, the global 
scale and essential nature of private governance of online speech sepa-
rate it in kind from the strictures governing individuals within these 
isolated organizations. 
The law reasons by analogy, yet none of these analogies to private 
moderation of the public right of speech seem to precisely meet the de-
scriptive nature of what online platforms are, or the normative results 
of what we want them to be.  The following Part argues for a new kind of 
understanding: seeing these platforms’ regulation of speech as governance. 
IV.  THE NEW GOVERNORS 
Thinking of online platforms from within the categories already es-
tablished in First Amendment jurisprudence — as company towns, 
broadcasters, or editors — misses much of what is actually happening in 
these private spaces.  Instead, analysis of online speech is best consid-
ered from the perspectives of private governance and self-regulation.454 
Analyzing online platforms from the perspective of governance is 
both more descriptively accurate and more normatively useful in ad-
dressing the infrastructure of this ever-evolving private space.  Platform 
governance does not fit neatly into any existing governance model, but 
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 452 For excellent discussions of the role of the university in free speech, see generally ROBERT C. 
POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURIS-
PRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE (2012); J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A “Special 
Concern of the First Amendment,” 99 YALE L.J. 251 (1989); and Robert Post, The Classic First 
Amendment Tradition Under Stress: Freedom of Speech and the University (Yale Law Sch., Public 
Law Research Paper No. 619, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3044434 [https://perma.cc/B9NH-
YFN6]. 
 453 See Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1241–42 (2016). 
 454 See, e.g., PASQUALE, supra note 125, at 140–68, 187–218 (arguing that terms of service or 
contracts are inappropriate or ineffective remedies in an essentially “feudal” sphere, id. at 144, and 
that platforms act as “sovereign[s]” over realms of life, id. at 163, 189); Freeman, supra note 15, at 
636–64 (describing the ability of private firms to self-regulate in areas of public interest with and 
without government influence); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2029, 2037–41 (2005) (discussing how private actors play an increasing role in the traditional 
government standard-setting, implementation, and enforcement functions through contracts and pri-
vate agreements).  On the role of voluntary self-regulation by private actors, see NEIL GUNNINGHAM 
ET AL., SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 167–70 (1998), which ana-
lyzes shortcomings of self-regulation, including lack of transparency and independent auditing, concern 
that performance is not being evaluated, and absence of real penalties for recalcitrants. 
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it does have features of existing governance models that support its cat-
egorization as governance.  As Parts II and III demonstrated, platforms 
have a centralized body, an established set of laws or rules, ex ante and 
ex post procedures for adjudication of content against rules, and demo-
cratic values and culture; policies and rules are modified and updated 
through external input; platforms are economically subject to normative 
influence of citizen-users and are also collaborative with external net-
works like government and third-party groups.  Another way to concep-
tualize the governance of online speech by platforms comes from admin-
istrative law, which has long implicated the motivations and systems 
created by private actors to self-regulate in ways that reflect the norms 
of a community.455  Perhaps most significantly, the idea of governance 
captures the power and scope these private platforms wield through 
their moderation systems and lends gravitas to their role in democratic 
culture.456  Changes in technology and the growth of the internet have 
resulted in a “revolution in the infrastructure of free expression.”457  The 
private platforms that created and control that infrastructure are the 
New Governors in the digital era. 
How does this new concept of private platform governors normatively 
fit in our hopes and fears for the internet?  For decades, legal scholars have 
moved between optimistic and pessimistic views of the future of online 
speech and long debated how — or whether — to constrain it.458  But the 
details of the private infrastructure of online speech were largely opaque.  
Does this new information and conception allay or augment scholarly con-
cerns over the future of digital speech and democratic culture? 
The realities of these platforms both underscore and relieve some of 
these fears.  For the optimists, interviews with the architects of these 
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 455 See Freeman, supra note 15, at 666; Michael, supra note 15, at 175–76; Michael P. Vandenbergh, 
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NW. U. L. REV. 1101, 1116–29 (2005). 
 456 Balkin, supra note 11, at 2296. 
 457 Id.  
 458 Lessig was an early pessimist about the future of the internet, seeing it as a potential means 
of regulation and control.  He specifically worried about the domination of the internet by commer-
cial forces that could be manipulated and controlled by the state.  LESSIG, supra note 21, at 71.  
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aries for enforcement.  See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 100; Boyle, supra note 100, at 202–04.  
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cratic culture.”  Balkin, supra note 7, at 46.  But recently he too has become concerned about the 
future of online speech and democracy, arguing that private platforms and government can together 
regulate online speech with less transparency, disruption, and obtrusion than ever before.  See  
Balkin, supra note 11, at 2342.  Scholars like Citron, Norton, and Franks have instead long argued 
for working with private platforms to change their policies.  See BAZELON, supra note 105, at 279–
89; Citron, supra note 102, at 121–25; Citron & Norton, supra note 104, at 1468–84; Franks, supra 
note 103, at 681–88; cf. Citron & Franks, supra note 106, at 386–90 (discussing the need for govern-
ments to craft criminal statutes prohibiting the publication of revenge porn). 
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platform content-moderation systems show how the rules and proce-
dures for moderating content are undergirded by American free speech 
norms and a democratic culture.459  These ideas are also part of their 
corporate culture and sense of social responsibility.  But perhaps more 
compellingly, platforms are economically responsive to the expectations 
and norms of their users.  In order to achieve this responsiveness, they 
have developed an intricate system to both take down content their users 
don’t want to see and keep up as much content as possible.  To do this 
has also meant they have often pushed back against government re-
quests for takedown.460  Procedurally, platform content-moderation sys-
tems have many similarities to a legal system.  Finally, platforms have 
a diverse pluralistic group of forces that informs updates of their  
content-moderation policies and procedures. 
Not only is governance the descriptively correct way to understand 
platform content moderation, but it is also rhetorically and normatively 
correct.  Historically, speech regulation has followed a dyadic model: a 
territorial government, with all the power that that invokes, has the boot 
on the neck of individual speakers or publishers.461  The New Governors 
are part of a new model of free expression: a triadic model.462  In this 
new model, online speech platforms sit between the state and speakers 
and publishers.  They have the role of empowering both individual 
speakers and publishers (as well as arguably minimizing the necessity of 
publishers to speaking and amplification), and their transnational pri-
vate infrastructure tempers the power of the state to censor.  These New 
Governors have profoundly equalized access to speech publication, cen-
tralized decentralized communities, opened vast new resources of com-
munal knowledge, and created infinite ways to spread culture.  Digital 
speech has created a global democratic culture,463 and the New  
Governors are the architects of the governance structure that runs it. 
The system that these companies have put in place to match the ex-
pectations of users and to self-regulate is impressively intricate and re-
sponsive.  But this system also presents some unquestionable downsides 
that grow increasingly apparent.  These can be seen in two main con-
cerns: (1) worries over loss of equal access to and participation in speech 
on these platforms; and correspondingly (2) lack of direct platform ac-
countability to their users. 
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 459 This is good news for Lessig, Balkin, and Benkler, given their concerns. 
 460 If this trend continues, it allays much of Balkin’s concern over collateral censorship in Old-
School/New-School Speech Regulation.  See Balkin, supra note 11. 
 461 Balkin, supra note 362 (manuscript at 4, 41). 
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A.  Equal Access 
There is very little transparency from these private platforms, mak-
ing it hard to accurately assess the extent to which we should be con-
cerned about speech regulation, censorship, and collateral censorship.464  
But separate from the question of secret government interference or col-
lusion, private platforms are increasingly making their own choices 
around content moderation that give preferential treatment to some us-
ers over others.465  The threat of special rules for public figures or news-
worthy events466 crystallizes the main value we need protected within 
this private governance structure in order to maintain a democratic cul-
ture: fair opportunity to participate. 
In some ways, an ideal solution would be for these platforms to put 
their intricate systems of self-regulation to work to solve this problem 
themselves without regulatory interference.  But the lack of an appeals 
system for individual users and the open acknowledgment of different 
treatment and rule sets for powerful users over others reveal that a fair 
opportunity to participate is not currently a prioritized part of platform 
moderation systems.  In a limited sense, these problems are nothing 
new — they are quite similar to the concerns to democracy posed by a 
mass media captured by a powerful, wealthy elite.467  Before the inter-
net, these concerns were addressed by imposing government regulation 
on mass media companies to ensure free speech and a healthy democ-
racy.468  But unlike mass media, which was always in the hands of an 
exclusive few, the internet has been a force for free speech and demo-
cratic participation since its inception.469  The internet has also made 
speech less expensive, more accessible, more generative, and more inter-
active than it had arguably ever been before.  These aspects of online 
speech have led to the promotion and development of democratic cul-
ture, writes Balkin, “a form of social life in which unjust barriers of rank 
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 464 These are the concerns expressed by Balkin, Lessig, Tushnet, and Wu.  See Balkin, supra note 
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 465 In September 2017, Twitter announced that it had a different content-moderation rule set for 
removing President Trump’s tweets.  Arjun Kharpal, Why Twitter Won’t Take Down Donald 
Trump’s Tweet Which North Korea Called a “Declaration of War,” CNBC (Sept. 26, 2017, 2:56 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/26/donald-trump-north-korea-twitter-tweet.html [https://perma.cc/ 
LXQ6-LXB9].  In December 2015, Facebook similarly disclosed that it had a different set of rules 
for removing the speech of then-candidate Trump than it had for other users.  Doug Bolton, This 
Is Why Facebook Isn’t Removing Donald Trump’s “Hate Speech” from the Site, INDEPENDENT 
(Dec. 15, 2015, 6:39 PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/donald-
trump-muslim-hate-speech-facebook-a6774676.html [https://perma.cc/XX4B-CX3V]. 
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 467 Balkin, supra note 7, at 30. 
 468 Id. at 31. 
 469 See BENKLER, supra note 98; LESSIG, supra note 21; Balkin, supra note 7, at 3–6. 
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and privilege are dissolved, and in which ordinary people gain a greater 
say over the institutions and practices that shape them and their futures.  
What makes a culture democratic, then, is not democratic governance, 
but democratic participation.”470 
Equal access to platforms is thus both an effect of a self-regulated 
and open internet and the cause of it, making regulation of this issue 
particularly difficult and paradoxical.  Legislating one user rule set for 
all not only seems logistically problematic, but it would also likely reduce 
platforms’ incentives to moderate well.  Such legislation, if consitutionally 
valid, would certainly run into many of the concerns raised by those who 
fear any regulation that might curb the robust power of § 230 immunity.  
This is why any proposed regulation — be it entirely new laws or 
modest changes to § 230471 — should look carefully at how and why the 
New Governors actually moderate speech.  Such, if any, regulation should 
work with an understanding of the intricate self-regulatory structure 
already in place in order to be the most effective for users. 
B.  Accountability 
Even without issues of equal access to participation, the central 
difficulty in simply allowing these systems to self-regulate in a way that 
takes into account the values and rights of their users is that it leaves 
users essentially powerless.  There is no longer any illusion about the 
scope and impact of private companies in online platforms and 
speech.472  These platforms are beholden to their corporate values, to 
the foundational norms of American free speech, and to creating a plat-
form where users will want to engage.  Only the last of these three mo-
tivations for moderating content gives the user any “power,” and then 
only in an indirect and amorphous way. 
Moreover, while it initially seems like a positive source of accountabil-
ity that these systems are indirectly democratically responsive to users’ 
norms, it also creates inherently undemocratic consequences.473  At first, 
adaptability appears to be a positive attribute of the system: its ability 
to rapidly adapt its rules and code to reflect the norms and values of 
users.  But that feature has two bugs: in order to engage with the most 
users, a platform is (1) disincentivized to allow antinormative content, 
and (2) incentivized to create perfect filtering to show a user only content 
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 470 Balkin, supra note 7, at 35. 
 471 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying 
Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 414–19 (2017) (proposing limited and 
narrow revisions to § 230 in order to “not break” the internet). 
 472 This was a central concern of Lessig’s — that the internet would be captured by large corpo-
rations.  See generally LESSIG, supra note 21. 
 473 For an excellent discussion of this interplay between corporate power, inequitable markets, 
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that meets her tastes.  These problems are interchangeably known as 
the so-called echo-chamber effect, which creates an antidemocratic 
space in which people are shown things with which they already asso-
ciate and agree, leading to nondeliberative polarization.  “It has never 
been our ideal — constitutionally at least — for democracy to be a per-
fect reflection of the present temperature of the people.”474  Whether 
through algorithmic filtering or new content rules, as platforms regress to 
the normative mean, users will not only be exposed to less diverse content, 
but they will also be less able to post antinormative content as external and 
internal content-moderation policies standardize across platforms. 
Since the 2016 American presidential election, the lack of accountabil-
ity of these sites to their users and to the government in policing fake 
news,475 commercial speech,476 or political speech477 has come to the fore 
of public consciousness.  In statements directly following the election of 
Trump as President, Zuckerberg emphatically denied the role of fake 
news in the result.478  But due to many of the factors discussed here — 
media pressure, corporate responsibility, and user expectations —  
Facebook was forced to start tackling the issue.479  Yet the power of 
these new threats to “spread[] so quickly and persuade[] so effectively” 
might make these indirect systems of accountability unexpectedly slow 
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 474 LESSIG, supra note 21, at 331.  
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for dealing with such emerging threats and issues.480  It also makes clear 
that some insertion of traditional government agency functions — such 
as regulation of commercial speech — when matched with an accurate 
understanding of how these platforms currently moderate content, could 
provide a potential answer to such issues of accountability.481 
The lack of accountability is also troubling in that it lays bare our 
dependence on these private platforms to exercise our public rights.  Be-
sides exit or leveraging of government, media, or third-party lobbying 
groups, users are simply dependent on the whims of these corporations.  
While platforms are arguably also susceptible to the whims of their us-
ers, this is entirely indirect — through advertising views, not through 
any kind of direct market empowerment.  One regulatory possibility 
might be a type of shareholder model — but this fails not only because 
Zuckerberg owns controlling shares of Facebook, but also because 
shareholder values of maximizing company profits are perhaps not well 
matched with user concerns over equal access and democratic account-
ability.  One potential nonregulatory solution to this problem would be 
for these corporations to register as public benefit corporations, which 
would allow public benefit to be a charter purpose in addition to the 
traditional maximizing profit goal.482 
Another avenue would be for platforms to voluntarily take up a com-
mitment to a notion of “technological due process.”483  In this ground-
breaking model for best practices in agency use of technology, Citron 
advocates for a model that understands the trade-offs of “automation 
and human discretion,” protects individuals’ rights to notice and hear-
ings, and gives transparency to rulemaking and adjudication.484  Of 
course, these private platforms have little motivation to surrender power 
as in a public benefit corporation, or to adopt the rules and transparency 
ideas of Citron’s technological due process requirements — but they 
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might if they fear the alternative would result in more restrictive regu-
lation.485  Should these platforms come under agency regulation, how-
ever, the concerns detailed by Citron’s notion of technological due pro-
cess combined with an accurate understanding of how such companies 
self-regulate will be essential to crafting responsive and accurate oversight. 
CONCLUSION 
As the Facebook Live video of Philando Castile’s death demon-
strates, content published on platforms implicates social policy, law, cul-
ture, and the world.486  Yet, despite the essential nature of these plat-
forms to modern free speech and democratic culture, very little is known 
about how or why the platforms curate user content.  This Article set 
out to answer these questions.  It began with an overview of the legal 
framework behind private platforms’ broad immunity to moderate con-
tent.  This framework comes from § 230, the purposes of which were 
both to encourage platforms to be Good Samaritans by taking an active 
role in removing offensive content and to protect users’ rights by avoid-
ing free speech problems of collateral censorship.  With this background, 
this Article explored why platforms moderate despite the broad immu-
nity of § 230.  Through interviews with former platform architects and 
archived materials, this Article argued that platforms moderate content 
partly because of American free speech norms and corporate responsi-
bility, but most importantly, because of the economic necessity of creat-
ing an environment that reflects the expectations of their users. 
Beyond § 230, courts have struggled with how to conceptualize 
online platforms within First Amendment doctrine: as company towns, 
as broadcasters, or as editors.  This Article has argued that the answer 
to how best to conceptualize platforms lies outside current categories in 
First Amendment doctrine.  Through internal documents, archived ma-
terials, interviews with platform executives, and conversations with con-
tent moderators, this Article showed that platforms have developed a 
system of governance, with a detailed list of rules, trained human deci-
sionmaking to apply those rules, and reliance on a system of external 
influence to update and amend those rules.  Platforms are the New  
Governors of online speech.  These New Governors are private self-
regulating entities that are economically and normatively motivated to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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reflect the democratic culture and free speech expectations of their users.  
But these incentives might no longer be enough. 
The impact of the video of Philando Castile, the public outcry over 
Napalm Girl, the alarm expressed at the Zuckerberg Town Hall meet-
ing, and the separate Twitter Rules for President Trump all reflect a 
central concern: a need for equal access to participation and more direct 
platform accountability to users.  These New Governors play an 
essential new role in freedom of expression.  The platforms are the 
products of a self-regulated and open internet, but they are only as 
democratic as the democratic culture and democratic particpation 
reflected in them.  Any proposed regulation — be it entirely new laws 
or modest changes to § 230 — should look carefully at how and why the 
New Governors actually moderate speech.  Such, if any, regulation 
should work with an understanding of the intricate self-regulatory 
structure already in place in order to be the most effective for users and 
preserve the democratizing power of online platforms. 
